IN  THE 
AMERICAN  COLONIES 


WILLIAM  SMITH  MfCLELLAN 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 
AT   LOS  ANGELES 


SMUGGLING  IN  THE   AMERICAN 

COLONIES    AT    THE    OUTBREAK 

OF  THE  REVOLUTION 

WITH 

SPECIAL  REFERENCE  TO  THE 
WEST  INDIES  TRADE 


JKHUltams  fflollege 

DAVID   A.  WELLS  PRIZE  ESSAYS 
Dumber  3 

SMUGGLING  AT  THE  OUTBREAK 
OF  THE  REVOLUTION 

WITH  SPECIAL  REFERENCE   TO   THE 
WEST  INDIES   TRADE 

BY 

WILLIAM  S.   McCLELLAN 


PRINTED   FOR  THE 

DEPARTMENT  OF  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 
OF  WILLIAMS  COLLEGE 

ffloffat,  J?ari»  anfc  Hompanp,  JZeto 

1912 


£15,1 


PREFACE 

THE  importance  of  whatever  economic  and 
governmental    questions    are   involved   in   a 
study  of  smuggling  at  the  outbreak  of  the 
American   Revolution   consists   primarily   in 
the  relation  they  bear  to  the  larger  questions 
of  a  similar  nature,  operative  at  the  time. 
7  In   general   terms,   the  Revolution   was   the 
-  result  of  a   constantly   developing  spirit  of 
,,.-  independence,  into  which  entered  many  ele- 
ments, the  political  being  quite  as  important 
,.v  as  the  economic.     It  will  be  the  purpose  of 
this  essay,  then,  to  establish  the  particular 
function  which  smuggling — and  especially  that 

CO 

~  in  connection  with  the  West  Indies  trade — 

f|  performed  in  bringing  to  bear  the  influences 

&5  exerted  by  these  two  elements.     To  accom- 

<v  plish  this  it  is  essential  to  treat  of  the  devel- 

oo  opment  of  American  colonial  trade  and  with 

|  it  the  growth  and  operation  of  the  British 

commercial  and  colonial  systems,   in  which 

jg   are  found  both  causes  and  effects  of  the  preva- 

: 

z  lence  of  smuggling. 


s  C50 


vi  PREFACE 

The  endeavor  has  been  made  to  eliminate 
from  this  essay  the  many  features  of  the 
British  colonial  and  commercial  systems 
which  do  not  have  a  very  direct  bearing  on 
the  question  of  smuggling,  but  it  has  seemed 
necessary  to  show  cause  why  many  of  these 
features  are  without  special  significance  in 
a  discussion  of  the  economic  and  govern- 
mental questions  which  arise.  No  attempt 
has  been  made  to  assign  any  comparative 
rating  to  the  influence  which  smuggling  may 
have  had  among  the  forces  which  resulted  in 
the  Revolution. 

Due  reference  has  been  made  in  the  foot- 
notes to  the  source  material  and  secondary 
authorities  consulted,  while,  for  convenience, 
a  complete  list  of  such  works  has  been  ap- 
pended. The  writer  is  greatly  indebted  to 
Assistant  Professor  David  Taggart  Clark  of 
Williams  College  for  assistance  in  the  prepar- 
ation of  the  manuscript  for  publication. 

WILLIAM  SMITH  MCCLELLAN. 

YORK,  PA.,  October,  1912. 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  I 

PAGE 

COLONIAL  TRADE 1 

Expansion  of  Commerce — Reasons  for  Growth  of  Trade 
between  England  and  West  Indies — West  Indies  Trade 
with  North  America — Slave  Trade  in  West  Indies — Char- 
acter of  Early  Traders — Effect  of  Early  Trade  Conditions. 

CHAPTER  II 

ENGLISH  COMMERCIAL  SYSTEM  .  8 


Sponsors  for  System — Precedents  for  System — Monopoly 
Features — Limitations  on  Direct  Importation  and  Expor- 
tation— "Enumerated  Articles" — Minor  Provisions  of 
Acts — Proposed  Ideal  Commercial  Position  of  England — 
Growth  of  Trade  between  England  and  America — Twofold 
Design  of  Mercantile  Policy — Bounties,  Premiums,  and 
Drawbacks — Restriction  of  Colonial  Manufactures — Eng- 
lish Commercial  Rivalries — Contemporary  Views  of 
System. 

CHAPTER  III 

THE    CAUSES   AND    CHARACTER    OF    COLONIAL 

SMUGGLING 27 

Differences  in  "Illicit  Trade" — Slight  Importance  of  Eva- 
sions of  Acts  restricting  Trade  to  England — England  the 
Natural  Trading  Place — Disadvantages  of  Exportation  to 
England — West  Indies,  the  Source  of  Money  for  Colonies 
— England,  the  Destination  of  Money  from  Colonies — 
West  Indies,  the  only  Adequate  Market — New  England 


Vlll  CONTENTS 

FAQB 

Fisheries  and  their  Dependence  on  West  Indies  Trade — 
Situation  in  Southern  Colonies — The  Molasses  Act  and 
its  Non-Enforcement — British  View  of  Continental  and 
West  Indies  Colonies — Organization  of  Customs  Service — 
Corruption  of  Service — Contraband  Trade  with  French 
and  Spanish — Motives  underlying  French  Contraband 
Trade  and  British  Objections  to  it — Political  and  Eco- 
nomic Motives — Assistance  of  Navy — Admiralty  Courts 
us.  Common  Law  Courts. 

CHAPTER  IV 

POLITICAL  SITUATION  IN  ENGLAND  AND  AMERICA      62 

Situation  revealed  by  French  Contraband  Trade — British 
Need  of  Revenue — Sugar  Act  and  Revenue  Measures — 
Colonists'  Objections  to  Revenue  Measures — The  Preroga- 
tive— Colonial  Governments — Character  of  Americans — 
Reasons  making  for  keeping  Idea  of  Independence  in 
Background — Early  Taxation  Measures — Political  Trou- 
bles of  Local  Nature — "Writs  of  Assistance." 

CHAPTER  V 

ENFORCEMENT  OF  LAW  AND  ITS  RESULTS  ....     79 

Universal  Bearing  of  Molasses  Act — Forces  converging  in 
1763 — Reforms  suggested  by  Evasions  of  Molasses  Act — 
Extent  of  Smuggling — Public  Sentiment — Commercial 
Grievances  vs.  Political  Grievances — Development  of 
National  Spirit — Conclusions. 


INTRODUCTION 

This  is  the  third  in  the  Williams  series  of 
David  A.  Wells  prize  essays  in  Political 
Science.  In  1904  Mr.  Elwin  L.  Page  was 
awarded  the  prize  for  an  essay  on  "The  Con- 
tributions of  the  Landed  Man  to  Civil 
Liberty;"  in  1907  Mr.  Shepard  A.  Morgan 
for  an  essay  on  "The  History  of  Parliamen- 
tary Taxation  in  England."  Mr.  McClellan 
received  the  prize  for  the  essay  following,  in 
1911. 

The  competition  is  open  to  Seniors  in 
Williams  College,  and  to  graduates  of  not 
more  than  three  years'  standing.  As  Williams 
offers  no  graduate  courses  it  is  obvious,  under 
these  circumstances,  that  the  award  does  not 
demand  original  research,  but  calls  rather  for 
"evidences  of  careful  reading  of  secondary 
authorities,"  and  the  "thoughtful  handling" 
and  working  over  of  material  readily  acces- 
sible upon  the  subjects  from  time  to  time 

suggested  for  treatment. 

ix 


X  INTRODUCTION 

In  the  present  essay  Mr.  McClellan  follows 
Professor  Ashley  and  others  in  carefully  and 
justly  distinguishing  between  the  general  body 
of  restrictive  trade  laws  constituting  the  old 
English  "colonial  system,"  and  the  special 
protective  legislation  of  1733  passed  in  the 
single  interest  of  the  sugar-planters  of  the 
British  West  Indies,  the  famous  "Molasses 
Act."  The  former,  the  general  restrictive 
laws,  the  author  holds,  did  not  operate  as 
serious  actual  constraint,  since  England,  the 
legal  beneficiary,  was  the  natural  monopolist 
of  the  colonial  trade;  the  latter,  the  "Molas- 
ses Act,"  defied  the  natural  channels  of  com- 
merce. 

As  a  result  of  these  circumstances,  the  viola- 
tions of  the  general  "system"  were  probably, 
the  essayist  writes,  relatively  slight  and  un- 
important, but  the  restrictions  on  imports 
from  the  West  Indies  were  systematically  and 
persistently  ignored,  producing  a  condition  of 
smuggling  so  universal  and  well-nigh  respect- 
able as  to  raise  the  question  whether  the 
operations  of  the  merchants  could  properly  be 
designated  by  that  term. 

When  a  reforming  British  minister,  at  the 


INTRODUCTION  xi 

end  of  the  French  and  Indian  War,  sought  to 
"clean  up"  America  in  this  regard,  while  he 
tried  to  induce  the  colonists  to  pay  a  minor 
share  of  the  expenses  of  their  own  defence, 
though  he  reduced  the  molasses  duties  by  half 
almost  as  soon  as  he  tried  to  collect  them,  his 
zeal  for  fiscal  efficiency  proved  both  futile 
and  ill-timed.  Otis  had  already  quickened 
the  spirit  of  protest  against  administrative 
surveillance,  and  now  commercial  irritation 
at  interference  with  established  courses  be- 
came blended  with  repugnance  to  outside 
taxation  of  any  sort,  and  ultimately  lost  in 
the  larger  political  issue  of  the  complete 
realization  of  the  spirit,  innate  in  the  colonies, 
of  American  independence.  Such  is  the  very 
briefest  outline  of  Mr.  McClellan's  essay. 

Thus  the  author  shows  again  the  error  in 
the  idea  that  the  colonists  fought  the  Revolu- 
tion simply  in  order  to  free  themselves  from 
the  general  constraint  of  the  colonial  system, 
while  he  makes  clear  the  force  and  meaning 
of  the  admission  which  John  Adams  declared 
himself  unashamed  to  make  "that  molasses 
was  an  essential  ingredient  of  our  indepen- 
dence." 


Xll  INTRODUCTION 

Chapters  III  and  V,  containing  the  bulk  of 
the  author's  distinctive  material,  and  his  con- 
clusions, or  better  Chapters  III  to  the  end, 
may  be  especially  commended  to  the  busy 
reader,  but  the  short  introductory  chapter  on 
the  New  World  commerce,  and  the  well- 
summarized  account  of  "The  English  Com- 
mercial System"  in  Chapter  II,  appropriately 
introduce  the  main  subject  of  the  essay,  which 
may  well  be  read  entire  for  the  interesting 
and  important  testimony,  from  contemporary 
and  later  writers,  which  the  author  has  co- 
ordinated together  on  the  commercial  life  of 
our  great-great-grandfathers,  and  on  the  rela- 
tions of  economic  and  political  forces  to  the 
birth  of  the  American  Republic. 

The  subject  set  for  competition  having  been 
"Smuggling  in  the  American  Colonies  at  the 
Outbreak  of  the  Revolution  with  especial 
Reference  to  the  West  Indies  Trade,"  Mr. 
McClellan  did  not  attempt  to  go  at  length 
into  the  somewhat  controverted  question  of 
the  amount  of  violation  of  the  general  Trade 
Acts,  particularly  of  the  great  Statute  of  1663 
which  sought  to  confine  so  much  of  the  co- 
lonial import  trade  to  England.  I  incline  to 


INTRODUCTION  xni 

the  opinion  that  a  more  thorough  investiga- 
tion of  all  the  evidence  available  on  this 
question  than  has  yet,  so  far  as  I  am  aware, 
been  made  might  show  somewhat  greater 
prevalence  of  the  smuggling  in  of  European 
goods  than  the  author's  essay,  in  its  present 
form  at  any  rate,  and  some  of  the  authorities, 
concede.  The  future  works  to  come  from  the 
authoritative  hand  of  Mr.  Beer  will  undoubt- 
edly illumine  this  question.  I  incline  to  think, 
also,  that  the  "enumeration"  of  great  colonial 
exports  operated  at  times  and  in  places  as  a 
slightly  more  conscious  inconvenience  than  has 
sometimes  been  suggested. 

Mr.  McClellan  was  unfortunately  deprived 
of  the  fullest  opportunity  which  he  would  have 
desired,  to  work  his  essay  over  before  publica- 
tion. 

Whatever  the  facts  may  have  been  before 
1763  or  before  1775,  it  seems  indisputable  that 
the  time  must  before  many  years  have  come 
when  the  general  restrictions  of  the  colonial 
system,  if  unmodified,  would  have  proved 
either  an  intolerable  shackle  upon  American 
development,  or  else  unenforceable,  or  more 
likely  both.  The  priority  of  England  in  the 


xiv  INTRODUCTION 

great  inventions  and  the  distraction  of  the 
Continent  in  war  would  have  postponed,  but 
could  hardly  have  averted  the  time.  Had 
American  commercial  freedom  not  been  ob- 
tained when  it  was,  or  before  many  decades, 
the  wonderful  story  of  material  progress  which 
ensued  must  have  read  some  degrees  less 
marvelously.  The  old  English  colonial  sys- 
tem, like  all  other  similar  systems,  was  eco- 
nomically vicious,  and  unenlightenedly  selfish, 
to  the  profit  of  a  part  and  not  of  the  whole, 
whatever  the  Navigations  Acts  may  have  done 
for  New  England  shipping  or  British  power  on 
the  sea.  The  very  recent  language  of  a  French 
critic  of  his  country's  colonial  policy  states  a 
principle  as  true  in  the  past  as  now.  "  Ce  n'est 
pas  en  reduisant  le  pouvoir  d'achat  des  indi- 
genes, en  leur  rendant  1'existence  plus  difficile, 
et  en  augmentant  les  prix  de  revient  de  toutes 
les  enterprises  coloniales  que  Ton  favorisera  la 
mise  en  valeur  de  nos  colonies  et  leur  puissance 
de  production,  done  d'acquisition  par  voie 
d'echange".1 

Happily  for  the  British  Empire,  since  the 
days  of  Grenville  and  Sheffield,  England  has 

1  Journ.  des  Economistes,  fevr.,  1912,  p.  227. 


INTRODUCTION  XV 

learned  a  wisdom  that  some  rivals  and  some  of 
her  own  colonies  might  well  emulate.  Should 
the  day  come  of  her  relapse  to  bygone  falla- 
cies, she  would  deal  with  her  own  hand  as 
serious  a  blow  as  any  that  she  might  give  to 
her  own  enduring  wealth  and  power. 

By  the  terms  of  the  foundation  of  the 
competition,  "No  subject  shall  be  selected 
for  competitive  writing  or  investigating  and 
no  essay  shall  be  considered  which  in  any  way 
advocates  or  defends  the  spoliation  of  prop- 
erty under  form  or  process  of  law;  or  the 
restriction  of  commerce  in  times  of  peace  by 
legislation,  except  for  moral  or  sanitary  pur- 
poses ;  or  the  enactment  of  usury  laws ;  or 
the  impairment  of  contracts  by  the  debase- 
ment of  coin;  or  the  issue  and  use  by  Govern- 
ment of  irredeemable  notes  or  promises  to 
pay  intended  to  be  used  as  currency  and  as 
a  substitute  for  money;  or  which  defends  the 
endowment  of  such  'paper,'  'notes,'  and 
'promises  to  pay'  with  the  legal  tender  qual- 
ity." A  subject  more  congenial  than  the 
present  to  the  spirit  and  letter  of  this  pro- 
vision, or  more  appropriate  could  hardly  be 
found  to  commemorate  the  name  and  the 


xvi  INTRODUCTION 

doctrine  as  an  economist  of  the  distinguished 
worker  whose  generosity  established  these 
prizes.  A  more  striking  or  momentous  in- 
stance of  legislative  favoritism  and  legislative 
fatuity  can  scarcely  exist,  in  all  the  modern 
history  of  blundering  governmental  inter- 
ference with  the  freedom  of  commerce,  than 
the  solemn  parliamentary  enactment  of  1733 
whose  inefficacy,  violation,  and  remoter  con- 
sequences it  was  Mr.  McClellan's  special  task 
to  set  forth. 

Bryan  Edwards  wrote  in  1793,  in  words  as 
applicable  to  the  trade  of  the  foreign,  as  of 
the  British,  West  Indies,  "It  may,  I  think,  be 
affirmed,  without  hazard  of  contradiction,  that 
if  ever  there  was  any  one  particular  branch  of 
commerce  in  the  world,  that  called  less  for 
restraint  and  limitation  than  any  other,  it  was 
the  trade  which,  previous  to  the  year  1774, 
was  carried  on  between  the  planters  of  the 
West  Indies  and  the  inhabitants  of  North 
America.*'  1 

The  philosophy  of  laisser  faire  is  unques- 
tionably inadequate  to  certain  exigencies  of 
our  time,  but  the  past  achievements  of  state 

Dublin  Edition,  II..  p.  377. 


INTRODUCTION  xvii 

regulation  of  trade  might  well  bespeak  a  little 
more  caution  and  modesty  in  the  facile  reason- 
ings of  some  cavalier  etatisme  of  the  present 
day. 

What  field  more  alluring  to  state  interven- 
tion than  where  humanity  cries  for  social  in- 
surance? Yet  it  is  a  German  professor  who 
even  here  raises  the  question  "si  nous  n'ob- 
tenons  pas  le  contraire  de  ce  que  nous  avons 
ambitionne,  si  nous  n'asservissons  pas  des 
forces  psychiques,  alors  que  nous  avons  voulu 
les  liberer,  si  nous  ne  creons  pas  la  dependance 
la  ou  nous  avons  desire  Findependance."1 

If  the  Molasses  Act  might  conceivably  have 
contemplated  any  imperial  object,  it  sought  to 
support  the  British  power;  in  the  outcome  it 
contributed  largely  to  the  loss  of  the  American 
empire. 

And  that  the  irony  of  events  might  nowise 
fail,  the  colonial  patriots  who  championed  in 
New  England  the  principles  of  English  liberty 
received  something  of  their  initial  impulse  to 
the  contest  for  freedom  and  free  molasses  from 
the  threatened  curtailment  of  their  profits  in 
the  distillation  of  intoxication  for  African 

1  Journ.  des  Economistes,  juillet,  1912,  p.  26. 


xviil  INTRODUCTION 

tyrants  and  the  thriving  business  of  negro  en- 
slavement, a  trade  apparently  still  plied  from 
the  city  of  the  Puritans  in  the  years  when  South 
Carolina,  like  Virginia,  was  being  opposed  by 
the  British  Government  in  her  effort  to  re- 
strict that  travesty  of  commerce,  while  the 
self-willed  little  colony  that  was  the  greatest 
smuggler  and  slaver  of  them  all  was  a  leader 
among  the  others  not  simply  in  her  religious 
and  political  freedom,  but  even  in  early,  though 
forgotten,  anti-slavery  legislation. 

The  noble  agitations  of  the  revolutionary 
epoch,  availing  much  for  the  black  man  as  for 
the  white,  failed,  alas!  to  do  enough,  and  it 
may  be  some  minor  portion  of  that  national 
retribution  of  which  George  Mason  warned  his 
countrymen,  that  the  fair  vision  of  commercial 
freedom,  which,  but  for  New  England's  "com- 
promise of  iniquity,"  might  seem  to  have 
shone  before  the  Republic  at  its  birth,  should 
in  the  later  days  have  become  so  clouded  and 
obscured,  to  the  entailing  of  political  evil,  in 
very  consequence  of  the  struggles  engendered 
by  the  Nation's  congenital  curse. 

It  appears  to  be  the  case  that,  in  the  gener- 
ation before  the  Revolution  at  least,  consider- 


INTRODUCTION  xix 

ably  greater  effort  was  made  to  enforce  the  law 
under  the  royal  governors  of  Massachusetts 
Bay  than  in  the  charter  colony  of  Rhode  Island, 
a  discrimination  resented  by  the  merchants  of 
Boston  which  apparently  contributed  not  a 
little  to  the  revolutionary  spirit  and  promi- 
nence of  that  port.  It  would  be  indeed  inter- 
esting to  speculate  whether  events  might  have 
been  appreciably  altered  had  there  been  uni- 
form enforcement  or  uniform  laxity  in  all  the 
colonies.  Modern  difficulties  springing  from 
variations  of  law  or  its  enforcement  in  different 
and  competing  jurisdictions  had  thus  this  in- 
teresting prototype. 

But  the  study  of  colonial  smuggling  must 
at  least  raise  a  deeper,  and  perhaps  a  sadder, 
question,  the  question  whether  sensitive  regard 
for  the  majesty  of  law  still  suffers  amongst  the 
American  people  from  the  injury  wrought  by 
the  foolish  legislative  officiousness  of  an  eigh- 
teenth-century English  Parliament. 

An  effort  has  been  made  to  free  this  essay 
from  any  material  error  of  statement  or  quota- 
tion, but  both  the  author  and  the  undersigned 
wil  be  grateful  for  information  of  any  in- 
accuracies that  may  be  found. 


XX  INTRODUCTION 

If  any  reader  of  Mr.  McClellan's  essay  shall 
be  led  as  was  the  undersigned,  to  seek  wider 
acquaintance  with  the  contemporary  pam- 
phleteers or  administrators  cited  in  its  pages, 
the  essayist  will  have  done  his  best  service, 
and  his  reader  be  amply  repaid  for  entry  into 
a  field  rich  in  interest,  replete  with  the  fasci- 
nation of  a  past  close-linked,  yet  contrasting, 
with  the  present,  the  strongly-individualized 
elder  brother  of  To-day. 

DAVID  TAGGART  CLARK, 

Assistant  Professor  of  Economics. 

WILLIAMS  COLLEGE,  October,  1912. 


SMUGGLING  IN  THE  AMERICAN 
COLONIES 

CHAPTER  I 

COLONIAL  TRADE 

WITH  the  discovery  of  America  in  1492, 
and  the  rounding  of  Africa  by  Da  Gama  in 
1497,1  supplemented  by  the  discovery  of  the 
Pacific  in  1513  and  by  Magellan's  voyage  six 
years  later,  commerce  left  its  narrower  bounds 
and  became  world- wide.  The  ports  on  the 

shores    of   the   Mediterranean  yielded    com- 

of 

mercial  supremacy  to  those  on  the  shores  Commerce 
of  the  Atlantic.  England,  France,  Denmark, 
Portugal,  and  Holland  followed  in  the  wake 
of  Spain  to  America,  attracted  by  the  pros- 
pects of  great  wealth.  To  commercial  enter- 
prise can  be  attributed  the  discovery  and 
rapid  development  of  the  West  Indies  and 
the  North  American  continent.  Much  of 

1  For  an  account  of  the  Spanish  explorations,  see  E.  G.  Bourne 
Spain  in  America,  chaps.  III-X. 


2         SMUGGLING  IN  THE  AMERICAN  COLONIES 

the  work  of  exploration  and  colonization 
was  left  in  the  hands  of  trading  companies 
and  individuals  who  incurred  the  necessary 
risks  for  the  sake  of  the  expected  returns. 

The   natural   route   for   the   early   traders 
to  follow  was  that  of  which  Columbus  was 
the  pioneer.     The  West  Indies,  therefore,  be- 
came the  earliest  great  trading  centre  of  the 
Reasons  for  New  World  commerce.     Sugar,  tobacco,  cot- 
Trade        Jton^coffee,  and  other  products  of  the  Islands, 
Between      were  in  great  demand  in  Europe,  for  hereto- 

England 

and  the       fore  the  supply  of  most  of  these  commodities 
West  indies  na(j  j^^  exceedingly  limited,  and  their  cost 

had  caused  them  to  be  classed  almost  as 
luxuries.  Spain  and  Portugal  had  always 
considered  that  the  foreign  trade  which 
brought  into  the  realm  the  largest  quantities 
of  gold  and  silver  was  the  most  profitable.1 
The  traders  of  those  countries,  therefore, 
early  gave  much  of  their  attention  to  the 
South  American  continent  where  the  mines 
needed  only  development  to  yield  almost 
unlimited  quantities  of  the  precious  metals. 

1  Cf.  E.  G.  Bourne,  Spain  in  America,  page  142.  "To  the  South, 
to  the  South,  for  the  riches  of  the  Aequinoctiall  they  that  seek  riches 
must  go,  not  unto  the  cold  and  frozen  North." — Peter  Martyr,  De 
Rebus  Oceanicis,  dec.  VIII.,  lib.  X,  in  Hakluyt,  Voyage*,  V.  475. 


COLONIAL  TRADE  3 

Not  only  was  the  importation  of  gold  and 
silver  counted  by  these  countries  as  the  chief 
function  of  foreign  trade,  but  prohibition 
was  placed  on  their  exportation.  Thus  the 
traders  of  these  countries  were  deprived  of  the 
legitimate  use  of  the  instrument  of  commerce, 
economically  considered  the  most  useful.  In 
England  and  France,  from  the  seventeenth 
century  on,  the  exportation  of  coin  alone  was 
prohibited  while  even  that  restriction  was 
lacking  in  Holland.  These  three  nations, 
abandoning  Bullionism  for  Mercantilism, 
moved  forward  towards  the  principle  made 
famous  by  Adam  Smith  that  "The  importa- 
tion of  gold  and  silver  is  not  the  principal, 
much  less  the  sole,  benefit  which  a  nation  de- 
rives from  its  foreign  trade.  Between  whatso- 
ever places  foreign  trade  is  carried  on,  they 
all  of  them  derive  two  distinct  benefits  from  it. 
It  carries  out  that  surplus  part  of  the  product 
of  their  land  and  labour  for  which  there  is  no 
demand  among  them  and  brings  back  in  return 
for  it  something  else  for  which  there  is  a  de- 
mand." Holland  advanced  farthest  toward 
this  principle,  though  even  she  fell  far  short  of 

1  Adam  Smith,  The  Wealth  of  Nations,  bk.  IV,  chap.  I. 


4         SMUGGLING  IN  THE  AMERICAN  COLONIES 

its  full  acceptance.  Considering  the  English 
trade  alone,  it  is  evident  that  by  reason  of  the 
nature  of  the  products  of  the  West  Indies,  and 
by  reason  of  the  requirements  of  the  two  sec- 
tions, the  inevitable  result  would  be  the  up- 
building of  a  great  trade.  The  demand  for 
the  products  of  the  Islands  came  to  be  hardly 
less  constant  than  the  demand  for  money  it- 
self, and  each  country  produced  principally 
that  which  the  other  could  not  produce  and 
sorely  needed. 

West  indies      The  reasons  which  led  to  the  rapid  growth 
North          °f  commerce  between  England  and  the  West 
America       Indies  held  equally  in  regard  to  the  devel- 
opment   of    trade    which    the    establishment 
of  the  North  American  colonies  opened  up.1 

1  Lord  Sheffield's  Bgures  for  the  trade  between  England  and  the 
West  Indies  are 

Imports  from  Exports  to 

West  Indies 

Av.  1700—1710  £629,127  £313,038 

Av.  1760—1770     273,334  1,133,233 

"Observations,"  App.,  table  No.  9,  page  20. 

The  decrease  in  imports  into  Great  Britain  is  an  apparent  decrease 
rather  than  a  real  one.  As  we  shall  later  see,  the  Islands  sent  the 
greater  part  of  their  products,  rum  and  molasses,  to  the  Northern 
colonies,  receiving  therefrom  products  which  Great  Britain  could 
not  so  readily  supply.  Much  of  their  products  was  subsequently 
re-exported  to  England  from  the  American  colonies. 


COLONIAL  TRADE  5 

The  West  Indies  were  placed  between  two 
markets  whose  demands  always  exceeded  the 
supply  and  from  each  of  which  they  could 
draw  in  return  those  goods,  manufactured  or 
natural,  without  which  they  would  be  seriously 
handicapped. 

The  history  of  the  slave  trade  in  the  West 
Indies  begins  almost  simultaneously  with  the 
discovery  of  the  Islands,  although  the  first 
strong  impetus  to  the  traffic  was  received  when 
Spain  authorized  an  importation  of  four  thou- 
sand slaves  into  the  Spanish  islands.1  An  The  Slave 
idea  of  the  extent  of  this  traffic  can  be  gained  the  West 
best  from  the  figures  furnished  by  Bryan 
Edwards,  the  historian  of  the  West  Indies, 
who  states  that  from  1700  to  1786  not  less 
than  610,000  slaves  were  imported  into  Ja- 
maica alone.2  Aside  from  its  extent,  the  slave 
trade  was  of  importance  economically  because 

1  The  Spanish  government  in  1517,  arranged  for  the  importation 
of  four  thousand  slaves  in  eight  years.     Continuously  after  that 
time  contracts  were  made  with  slave  dealers  to  import  slaves  in  in- 
creasing numbers.     The  business  between  1609  and  1615  was  con- 
ducted in  the  king's  name.     Cf.  E.  G.  Bourne,  Spain  in  America, 
American  Nation  Series,  III,  chap.  XVIII. 

2  Edwards  estimates  that  from  1680  to  1786,  52,130,000  slaves  were 
imported  into  all  the  British  colonies  in  America.     Hist,  of  W.  I., 
Bk.  IV,  Ch.  II. 


6         SMUGGLING  IN  THE  AMERICAN  COLONIES 

it  was  only  through  it  that  the  sugar  cultiva- 
tion was  fostered. 

The  West  Indies  offered  strong  attractions 
to  the  traders  of  European  nations.  The 
vessel  laden  with  a  miscellaneous  cargo  of 
manufactured  goods  could  find  many  ports 
which  offered  numerous  customers.  It  must 
always  be  remembered,  however,  that  this 
trade  was  fraught  with  unusual  dangers. 
The  presence  of  pirates  and  near-pirates  had  to 
be  reckoned  with.  The  formation  of  the  Islands 
rendered  them  particularly  suitable  for  the 
rendezvous  of  all  kinds  of  freebooters.  Constant 
warfare  between  European  nations  greatly 
stimulated  privateering  and  their  contests 
over  the  possession  of  one  or  another  of  the 
islands  added  to  the  dangers  of  commerce  and 
made  any  restrictive  law,  which  any  one  nation 
might  enact,  little  better  than  a  dead  letter. 
Character  It  is  doubtful  if  many  of  the  traders  them- 
Traders  selves  were  of  a  much  better  class  than  the 
pirates.  Admiral  Penn  has  been  described, 
though  perhaps  with  some  exaggeration,  as 
"little  better  than  the  piratical  sea-dog  of  his 
time."  The  navigators  of  the  age,  if  not 

1Fiske,   The  West  Indict,  79. 


COLONIAL  TRADE  7 

law-disregarding  by  nature,  were  bold  and 
daring  by  necessity.  Consequently  if  the 
ready  customers  were  not  forthcoming,  the 
trader  could  often  force  an  exchange  on 
some  of  the  weaker  islanders  or  find  a  readier 
market  at  some  unrestricted  port.  These 
possibilities  of  breaking  through  the  commer- 
cial restrictions  universal  in  the  age  aided 
materially  in  establishing  the  commercial  po- 
sition of  the  West  Indies. 

The  effect  which  this  type  of  traders  and  The  Effect 
their  methods  had  on  the  rapidly  disappear-  Trade 
ing  native  islanders  and  the  colonists,  not  Conditlons 
of  the  highest  character  at  best,  could  hardly 
have  been  other  than  to  create  an  eager  and 
tacit  acceptance  of  smuggling  and  all  kinds 
of  illicit  trade  as  matters  of  course.  Such  was 
the  heritage  which  they  bequeathed  to  the 
island  inhabitants  of  the  succeeding  centuries 
and  it  was  with  much  the  same  spirit,  accen- 
tuated by  a  keener  commercial  capacity,  that 
their  descendants  entered  into  trade  relations 
in  that  later  period  when  the  trade  between 
the  West  Indies  and  the  North  American 
continent  became,  as  we  shall  see,  essential 
to  the  development  of  the  latter. 


CHAPTER  II 

ENGLISH  COMMERCIAL  SYSTEM 

WHEN  Grenville  became  the  practical  head 
of  George  Ill's  government  in  1763,  a  more 
thorough  attempt  was  made  than  ever  before 
to  enforce  the  Acts  of  Trade  and  Navigation. 
Fully  to  understand  the  scope  of  these  acts 
it  is  necessary  to  go  back  more  than  a  century. 
Almost  all  additions  after  that  of  the  7th  and 
8th  of  William  III  merely  added  points  of 
detail  or  aimed  to  facilitate  the  execution  of 
the  laws  of  this  class  passed  in  the  seventeenth 
century.  A  careful  study  of  these  acts  reveals 
sponsors  of  the  fact  that  behind  them  stood  as  sponsors 
Commercial  an<^  chief  beneficiaries  the  merchants  and 
System  shipping  interests.  It  was  they  who  reaped 
the  lion's  share  of  the  benefits  and  not,  ex- 
cept as  shipping  favored  naval  defense,  the 
British  people.  In  the  Ordinance  of  1645  it 
is  stated  that  "Nothing  more  enricheth  this 
Kingdome  than  commerce."  This  proposi- 


ENGLISH  COMMERCIAL  SYSTEM  9 

tion  was  the  basis  on  which  the  early  acts 
rested.  Theoretically,  increased  commerce 
was  to  result  in  greater  wealth  in  Great 
Britain,  especially  for  the  people  as  a  whole; 
practically,  the  wealth  was  absorbed  by  the 
great  merchants  and  ship-owners,  and  the 
people  received  such  benefits  as  they  did  only 
very  indirectly.  Those  indirect  advantages 
accruing  to  them  from  the  colonial  system,  as 
distinct  from  the  Navigation  Laws,  were  more 
than  offset  by  the  expense  of  the  system  and 
the  cost  of  the  whole  colonial  scheme  of  the 
period.  After  the  Stuarts  until  1763  revenue 
for  the  public  treasury  was  only  a  minor  part 
of  the  commercial  program.  Bancroft,  quot- 
ing from  the  Grenville  Papers,  says  that  an 
American  revenue  of  less  than  £2000  cost  Great 
Britain  £7000  or  £8000  a  year  to  collect.1 

England  could  point  to  precedent  in  adopt-  Precedent 
ing  the  maritime  policy  about  to  be  described, 


inasmuch  as  every  other  sea-power  of  Europe  Policy  of 
f  England 

had  and  was  enforcing  a  similar  plan,  attended 

often  with  much  more  severity.  The  Span- 
ish colonies  could  trade  legally  with  Spain 
alone  and  until  1765  and  later  their  trade  had  to 

1  III,  31  .    See  also  Fisher,  The  Struggle  for  American  Independence,  5  1  . 


10       SMUGGLING  IN  THE  AMERICAN  COLONIES 

go  almost  wholly  to  one  port,  first  Seville,  then 
Cadiz.1  Portugal  formulated  similar  restric- 
tions for  the  Brazilian  trade,  while  France  and 
Holland  confined  their  colonies  only  less  closely. 
It  was  therefore  the  system  which  seemed  the 
natural  one  and  every  act  of  trade  formed  a 
step  in  the  upbuilding  of  the  whole  structure. 
Lord  Sheffield  in  his  "Observations  on 
American  Commerce,"  writing  when  our  colo- 
nial period  had  just  closed,  remarks,  "The 
only  use  and  advantage  of  American  Colonies 
Monopoly  or  West  Indies  Islands  is  in  the  monopoly  of 
their  consumption  and  the  carriage  of  their 
produce."  His  sweeping  statement  repre- 
sents the  extreme  view  of  the  protectionists 
but  nevertheless  contains  one  guiding  motive 
of  the  commercial  legislation.  The  monopoly 
feature  was  considered  essential  by  all.  G.  L. 
Beer,  referring  to  the  earlier  period,  gives  as 
the  standard  by  which  England  measured  the 
value  of  her  colonies,  the  ability  of  the  colony 
to  produce  "commodities  that  the  mother 
country  would  otherwise  have  to  buy  from 
foreigners." 2  Properly  and  legally  to  secure  to 

1  See  E.  G.  Bourne,  Spain  in  America,  chap.  rix. 
1  G.  L.  Beer,  British  Colonial  Policy,  135. 


ENGLISH  COMMERCIAL  SYSTEM  11 

the  mother  country  this  advantage  it  was 
enacted  in  1660:  "That  from  and  after  the 
First  Day  of  April,  1661,  no  Sugars,  Tobacco, 
Cotton-Wool,  Indicoes,  Ginger,  Fustick  or 
other  dying  Wood,  of  the  Growth,  Production, 
or  Manufacture  of  any  English  Plantations  in 
America,  Asia,  or  Africa  shall  be  shipped,  car- 
ried, conveyed,  or  transported  from  any  of  the  Direct 
English  Plantations  in  America  to  any  Land,  Limited 
Island,  Territory,  Dominion,  Port,  or  Place 
whatsoever,  other  than  to  such  other  English 
Plantations  as  do  belong  to  His  Majesty,  His 
Heirs  and  Successors,  or  to  the  Kingdom  of 
England  or  Ireland,  or  Principality  of  Wales, 
or  Town  of  Berwick  upon  Tweed,  there  to  be 
laid  on  Shore,  under  Penalty  of  the  Forfeiture 
of  the  said  Goods,  or  the  full  Value  thereof,  as 
also  of  the  Ship,  with  all  her  Guns,  Tackle, 
etc."1  In  addition  to  these  penalties,  liability 
to  forfeiture  of  bonds,  required  to  bring  the 
goods  into  lawful  territory,  was  intended  to 
make  doubly  sure  the  compliance  with  the  law. 
The  commodities  specifically  mentioned 
in  this  act  formed  what  were  called  the  "enu- 
merated articles."  The  purpose  of  the  forma- 

1  First  Navigation  Act.     12,  Charles  II,  c.  18,  1660. 


12       SMUGGLING  IN  THE  AMERICAN  COLONIES 

tion  of  this  class  was  to  give  to  the  British 
merchant  a  monopoly  in  the  distribution  of 
these  goods  and  to  the  English  manufacturer  a 
rich  supply  of  raw  materials  and  a  virtually 
non-competitive  market.1  While  the  non- 
Enumerated  enumerated  articles  could  be  carried  at  first 
to  any  part  of  the  world,  it  must  be  remem- 
bered that  legally  after  1663  the  colonists 
would  usually  have  to  return  in  ballast,  or 
sell  their  ships,  or  meet  the  expenses  of  un- 
loading and  reloading  at  some  English  port. 
In  final  analysis,  th§  act  diminished  profitable 
exportation  from  the  colonies  to  any  but  Eng- 
lish ports  and  it  is  self-evident  that  the  pur- 
pose of  the  act  was  to  favor  the  home  country 
and  that  there  was  only  secondary  thought 
of  revenue  involved. 

Following  quickly  was  the  Act  of  1663, 
which  prohibited  the  bringing  into  the  colo- 
nies, except  from  English  ports,  of  commodi- 

1  The  restrictions  in  this  "enumerated"  list  were  not  as  severe 
as  would  appear  at  first  glance.  "None  of  the  staple  articles  of  the 
trade  of  New  England  were  ever  enumerated  during  the  century 
1660-1760, — neither  fish,  nor  vessels,  nor  timber  (except  masts  and 
bowsprits  after  1706),  nor  rum;  and  during  the  whole  period  before  us 
they  could  be  carried  wherever  a  market  might  be  found."  W.  J.  Ash- 
ley, Surveys,  page  315.  Tobacco,  the  staple  product  of  Virginia,  was 
thus  at  first  the  only  continental  commodity  of  importance  on  the  list, 
and  this  was  given  by  law  a  more  than  adequate  market  in  England. 


ENGLISH  COMMERCIAL  SYSTEM  13 

ties  "of  the  Growth,  Production  or  Manufac- 
ture of  Europe."1  The  preamble  to  this  sec- 
tion furnishes  an  excellent  illustration  of  the 
attitude  assumed  towards  colonial  possessions  Direct 
by  England.  It  reads,— "And  in  regard  His 
Majesty's  Plantations  beyond  the  Seas  are 
inhabited  and  peopled  by  His  Subjects  of  this, 
His  Kingdom  of  England,  For  the  maintaining 
a  greater  Correspondence  and  Kindness  be- 
tween them  and  keeping  them  in  a  firmer  De- 
pendence upon  it,  and  rendring  them  yet  more 
beneficial  and  advantageous  unto  it,  in  the 
farther  Imployment  and  Encrease  of  English 
Shipping  and  Seamen,  Vent  of  English  Woolen 
and  other  Manufactures  and  Commodities, 
rendring  the  Navigation  to  and  from  the  same 
more  safe  and  cheap,  and  making  this  King-  mustrati°n 

of  Britain's 

dom  a  Staple,  not  only  of  the  Commodities  of  Attitude 
those  Plantations,  but  also  of  the  Commodi-  c°J^als 
ties  of  other  Countries  and  Places,  for  the  sup-  Possessions 
plying  of  them,  and  it  being  the  Usage  of  other 
Nations  to  keep  their  Plantation  Trade  to 

1  15,  Charles  II,  c.  7,  sec.  VI.  Sec.  VII  of  the  same  act  makes  ex- 
ceptions in  the  case  of  salt  for  the  New  England  and  Newfoundland 
lisheries,  of  wines  from  Madeira  and  the  Azores,  servants  and  horses 
from  Scotland  and  Ireland,  etc.  In  all  cases,  however,  the  shipping 
must  be  done  in  English  vessels  with  English  masters  and  crews.  The 
term  "English"  included  colonial. 


14       SMUGGLING  IN  THE  AMERICAN  COLONIES 


Other 

Provisions 
of  Acts 


Additions 
and  Modi- 
fications 


themselves,  Be  it  enacted,  .  .  .  "l  While 
the  wording  is  made  to  indicate,  in  some  places 
that  the  colonists  are  to  receive  their  share  of 
the  expected  boons,  the  preamble,  as  a  whole, 
leaves  no  doubt  as  to  the  intent  of  the  law  itself. 

The  remaining  provisions  of  the  earlier 
acts  operated  for  the  advantage  of  the  co- 
lonial almost  as  much  as  for  the  English 
merchants.  Objections  to  them  were  of  slight 
importance  and  reflected  local  rather  than 
general  conditions  of  commerce  and  senti- 
ment. Briefly,  they  were,  (1)  The  confining 
of  the  carrying  trade  to  English  or  colonial 
ships,  whose  master  and  three-fourths  of 
whose  crews  must  be  English ; 2  (2)  The 
exclusion  of  foreigners  from  the  coasting 
trade;3  (3)  The  prohibiting  of  aliens  to 
act  as  factors  or  merchants  in  the  colonies. 

Subsequent  acts  added  to  the  list  of  enu- 
merated articles  and  more  narrowly  restricted 
the  number  of  ports  to  which  non-enumerated 
articles  might  be  sent.  From  time  to  time, 
amendments  were  made  designed  to  offset 
some  of  the  conditions  which  the  colonists 

1  Second  Navigation  Act.     15,  Charles  II,  c.  7,  sec.  V,  1663. 
2 12,  Charles  II,  c.  18.     Sec.  i.,  iii. 
» 12,  Charles  II,  c.  18,  Sec.  vi. 


ENGLISH  COMMERCIAL  SYSTEM  15 

found  most  objectionable  and  about  which 
they  made  the  greatest  complaint. 

England,  by  these  acts,  was  to  play  the 
part  of  producer  or  consumer  or  middleman  in 
nearly  every  transaction  in  which  the  colonies 

figured.     If  the  Continental  nations  were  to  Proposed 

Ideal 

trade   directly   with   America,   English   mer-  commercial 


chants  would  be  subjected  to  a  competition  081,*10*!  of 
unfair  in  the  business  conception  of  the  time. 
For  the  colonies  England  was  to  be  the  great 
distributing  point  from  which  everything 
was  to  be  received  and  to  which  many  of  the 
most  important  colonial  products  —  all  those, 
in  fact,  distinctively  non-European  in  char- 
acter —  were  exclusively  to  be  sent.  From  the 
standpoint  of  the  British  merchant,  the  en- 
forcement of  these  acts  would  create  an  ideal 
market  in  America,  one  in  which  he  could  sell 
high  and  buy  low.  From  the  standpoint  of 
the  British  statesman,  their  enforcement  would 
mean  the  realization  of  the  ideal  towards 
which  European  nations  strove,  —  "A  self- 
sufficient  economic  empire."  l 

The  great  growth  of  trade  between  England 
and   America   is   attested   by   these   figures: 

1  G.  L.  Beer,  Col.  Pol.,  209. 


16       SMUGGLING  IN  THE  AMERICAN  COLONIES 


Growth 
of  Trade 
Between 


Encourage- 

ments 

Offered 
American 


Twofold 
Design  of 
Mercantile 
Policy 


the  exports  from  the  colonies  increased  from 
£265,783  in  1710  to  £1,044,591  in  1770, 
while  the  imports  rose  from  £267,205  to 
£1,763,409  in  the  same  years.1 

If  the  upbuilding  of  a  great  trade  between 
England  and  America  meant  success  to  the 
British  trader,  that  very  success  carried  with 
it,  in  a  smaller  measure,  the  success  of  the 
American  trader.  Each  ship  that  came  to 
the  colonies  laden  with  the  profit-bearing 
goods  of  the  Englishman  departed  laden  with 
goods  whose  sale  meant  profit,  not  always  in 
smaller  degree,  for  the  colonist.  In  fact,  it  is 
not  too  much  to  say  that  much  aid  toward 
promoting  the  prosperity  of  the  colonies  was 
offered  by  the  English  authorities,  with  the 
very -important  proviso,  however,,  that  in  the 
achieving  of  this  prosperity,  the  interests  of 
the  English  merchants  should  always  be 
maintained  as  paramount.  In  1750  an  act 
was  passed  "to  encourage  the  Importation 
of  Pig  and  Bar  Iron  from  His  Majesty's 
Colonies  in  America;  and  to  prevent  the 
Erection  of  any  Mill  or  other  Engine  for 


1  Lord  Sheffield,  Observations,  App.,  table  No.  9,  page  24.     Figures 
are  averages  for  the  decades  preceding  each  date. 


ENGLISH  COMMERCIAL  SYSTEM  17 

Slitting  or  Rolling  of  Iron;  or  any  Plateing 

t 

Forge  to  work  with  a  Tilt  Hammer;  or  any 
Furnace  for  making  Steel  in  any  of  the  said 
Colonies."1  This  illustrates  excellently  the 
twofold  design  of  the  colonial  policy.  By  ad- 
mitting free  of  duty  the  pig-iron  which  could 
not  be  advantageously  produced  in  England, 
encouragement  is  given  to  colonial  activity  in 
that  pursuit,  but  this  activity  must  cease  when 
it  reaches  a  point  where  the  further  develop- 
ment of  the  industry  can  be  carried  on  with  Bounties 
great  profit  in  England.  Earlier  than  this, 
during  Anne's  reign,  bounties  began  to  be 
paid  for  the  importation  into  England,  from 
America,  of  tar,  pitch,  rosin,  turpentine,  masts, 
yards,  and  bowsprits.  Bancroft  points  cut, 
however,  that  this  relieved  England  of_the 
necessity  of  jdepending^ _uppn  Sweden for  these, 
essentials  of  the  ship-builders'  craft  and  of 
the  navy.2 

Pitkin,  writing  about  1817,  mentions  a 
society  instituted  in  London  some  sixty  years 
earlier  "for  the  encouragement  of  arts,  manu- 
factures, and  commerce,"  offering  premiums 

1  23,  George  II,  ch.  XXIX. 

1 G.  Bancroft,  History  of  the  United  States,  II.  84. 


18       SMUGGLING  IN  THE  AMERICAN  COLONIES 

for  the  production  in  the  colonies  and  expor- 
tation to  England  of  certain  articles,  mostly  in 
Premiums  the  raw  state.1  Virginia  and  Maryland  to- 
bacco planters  were  favored  in  laws,  later  re- 
pealed, which  prohibited  tobacco  culture  in 
England,  a  prohibition  which  for  many  years 
provoked  great  opposition  .although  the  un- 
suitableness  of  English  soil  and  climate  for 
raising  tobacco  of  the  finest  quality  early 
appeared. 

The  laws  forbidding  direct  importation  from 

the  European  Continent  were  made  less  severe 

by  a  system  of  rebates  on  the  English  duties. 

In  most  cases  the  duties  that  were  paid  on 

bringing  merchandise  into  England  for  sub- 

sequent exportation  to  America  were  refunded 

excepting  one-half  of  the  so-called  "old  sub- 

Drawbacks   sidy"  of  5%.     Therefore  the  charges  were  usu- 

Rebates       ally  IGSS  than  the  import  duties  for  which  the 


English  consumer  was  held  responsible.  Fur- 
thermore, many  of  the  articles  which  were 
among  America's  chief  products,  such  as  lum- 
ber7lisn7  salted  provisions,  and  rum,  were,  as 
stated,  not  on  the  enumerated  list  and  could, 


1  T.  Pitkin,  Statistical  View  of  the  Commerce  of  the  United  States, 
12. 


ENGLISH  COMMERCIAL  SYSTEM  19 

until  1766,  be  shipped  to  any  part  of  the  world, 
provided  that  the  shipping  was  carried  on  in 
English  or  colonial  bottoms,  whose  crews  were 
three-fourths  English  and  under  an  English 
master,  although  in  1764  hides  and  skins  were 
put  into  the  enumeration,  and  iron  and  lumber 
for  a  short  time. 

While  an  underlying  motive,  tending  always 
to  the  giving  of  an  advantage  to  the  English 
manufacturer,  merchant,  or  trader,  can  be  Partially 
found  for  the  encouragements  offered  the  Benefits 
colonists,  it  must  in  fairness  be  said,  that  it 
was  not  an  entirely  arbitrary  method  that 
England  adopted  to  secure  the  monopoly  of 
her  colonial  trade  in  America,  but,  rather, 
one  constructed  to  give  the  appearances  of 
partially  mutual  benefits,  which  were  in  a 
measure  realized.1 

In  the  new  land  of  America  the  tilling  of 
the  soil  yielded  the  richest  returns,  but  it 
was  natural  that  a  number  of  the  inhabitants 
turned  their  attentions  and  energies  to  other 
pursuits.  Various  manufactures,  the  knowl- 
edge of  which  had  been  brought  from  Eng- 
land, and  other  European  countries,  sprang 

1  See  particularly  Ashley,  Surveys,  317-360. 


20       SMUGGLING  IN  THE  AMERICAN  COLONIES 

up.  The  linen-  and  woolen-cloth  makers, 
the  paper-makers,  the  hat-makers,  and  the 
iron-makers  began  to  ply  their  trades.  Of 
course  their  products  could  not  begin  to 
supply  all  the  demand  of  the  rapidly  growing 
colonies,  but  the  effect  of  the  increased  supply 
was  felt  by  the  manufacturers  in  England 
and  in  1731  the  Board  of  Trade  and  Planta- 
tions was  instructed  to  make  a  report  "with 
respect  to  the  laws  made,  manufactures  set 
Colonial  up,  or  trade  carried  on  in  the  colonies  detri- 
tures  mental  to  the  trade,  navigation,  or  manu- 

factures of  Great  Britain."  The  findings  of 
the  Board  were  that  the  colonies  north  of  Vir- 
ginia, having  less  outlet  for  their  natural  prod- 
ucts, were  more  likely  to  develop  manufactures 
than  those  in  the  South.  The  difference  in 
this  regard  had  been  observed  by  Sir  Josiah 
Child,  writing  about  1668,  "All  our  Planta- 
tions, except  that  of  New-England,  produce 
Commodities  of  different  Natures  from  those 
of  this  Kingdom,  as  Sugar,  Tobacco,  Cocoa, 
Wool,  Ginger,  etc.,  whereas  New-England  pro- 
duces generally  the  same  we  have  here,  viz., 
Corn  and  Cattle."1  In  the  possibility, 

1  New  Discourse  of  Trade,  2nd  ed.,  p.  213. 


ENGLISH   COMMERCIAL  SYSTEM  21 


then,    of    the    northern    colonies'    developing 
manufactures  was  a  weakness  in  the  protective 

wall  being  built  around  the  English  producer. 

-    -      -  -  -  V\^>^ 

facTurer  lay  at  the  bottom  of  the  acts  for-     f  r\\t)i« * 


\J^-'       Jealousy  on  the  part  of  the  British  manu- 

x  <  i  *    <   »ii  vi 

mulated     .  _ 


mulated  to  restrict  colonial  manufacture. 
In  addition  to  the  danger^  of  the  curtailing 
of  the  colonial  market,  fears  were  entertained 
that  the  new  rivals  would  begin  exporting 
to  European  markets  which  the  English  were 
then  supplying.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the 
products  of  American  manufacturing,  with  Manufac- 
the  possible  exception  of  that  of  hat-making,  *u"ng 
supplied  but  a  small  part  of  the  domestic  Unimpor- 
needs.  In  Table  two  of  Pitkin's  "Statis- 
tical View"  an  account1  of  the  articles 
exported  from  all  the  British  continental  col- 
onies in  the  year  1770,  when,  if  ever,  the 
American  manufactures  would  have  been 
developed,  shows  scarce  half  a  dozen  items  out 
of  a  possible  sixty -four  that  could  rightfully 
be  classed  as  manufactured  goods.  Although 
some  of  the  laws  restricting  manufacturing 
had  been  in  force  long  before  1770,  their  effect 
on  the  volume  of  production  was  slight  and 

1  T.  Pitkin,  Statistical  View,  2nd  ed.,  1817,  pp.  21  ff. 


22       SMUGGLING  IN  THE  AMERICAN  COLONIES 

the  existence  of  the  laws  would  not  affect  the 
value  of  the  above  citation. 

The  fear  of  competition,  however,  was  so 
strong  that,  as  early  as  the  time  of  William 
III,  when  the  woolen  manufacture  was  prohib- 
ited to  Ireland,  pressure  enough  was  brought 
to  bear  to  allow  the  passage  of  an  act,  dras- 
Manufac-  tically  worded  in  sum  as  follows,  "After  the 

tures 

Restricted  First  Day  of  December,  1669,  no  Wool  or 
Manufactures  made  or  mixt  with  Wool,  being 
of  the  Product  or  Manufacture  of  any  of  the 
English  Plantations  in  America,  shall  be 
loaden  in  any  Ship  or  Vessel,  uponvany  Pre- 
tence whatsoever — nor  loaden  upon  any  Horse, 
Cart,  or  other  Carriage — to  be  carried  out  of 
the  English  Plantations  to  any  other  of  the 
said  Plantations,  or  to  any  other  Place  what- 
soever."1 One  of  the  rather  vague  reasons 
advanced  at  the  time  for  the  necessity  of  this 
act  was  that  colonial  industry  along  the  lines 
most  profitable  in  England,  wTould  "inevitably 
sink  the  value  of  lands"  in  England,  as  the 
preamble  has  it.  The  interests  of  the  landed 
gentry  and  of  the  wealthy  classes  were  being 
carefully  guarded.  No  trace  of  reciprocal 

1  10  and  11,  William  III,  ch.  x. 


ENGLISH  COMMERCIAL  SYSTEM  23 

benefits   can   be  found   in   these   enactments  No  Mutual 

.     .  „  XT  >  Benefits 

restricting  manufactures.     JNotning  in   them 

can  be  construed  as  aiding  anyone  but  the 
British  manufacturer  or  wool-grower. 

We  must  not  overlook  the  fact  that  while 
the  inherent  value  of  the  colonies  themselves 
was  the  main  reason  for  which  England  for-  ^OIt&J1C6 
mulated  these  laws,  the  commercial  struggle  England's 
with  France,  Spain,  and  especially  Holland, 
in  which  England  was  then  desperately  en- 
gaged, allowed  the  spirit  of  business  rivalry 
to  have  an  undue  influence.  S.  G.  Fisher, 
seemingly  without  complete  accuracy  of  detail, 
remarks  on  this  point,  "The  first  important 
product  from  the  colonies  was  tobacco  from 
Virginia;  and  the  king,  who  could  at  that  time,1 
without  the  aid  of  Parliament,  impose  duties 
and  taxes,  put  a  heavy  duty  on  this  tobacco 
from  Virginia.  The  Virginians  accordingly 
sent  all  their  tobacco  to  Holland.  This  sim- 
ple instance  shows  both  the  cause  and  prin- 
ciple of  all  the  navigation  laws.  If  Holland, 
England's  rival  in  commerce,  was  to  reap  all 

1  S.  A.  Morgan  in  the  History  of  Parliamentary  Taxation,  pages 
241  ff.,  discusses  fully  the  question  of  the  right  of  the  king  to  collect 
imposts. 


24       SMUGGLING  IN  THE  AMERICAN  COLONIES 

the  advantage  of  Virginia's  existence,  of  what 
value  to  England  was  Virginia?"  l  In  part 
then  for  commercial  jealousy  the  Virginians 
were  ordered  to  ship  only  to  England,  where 
they  were  granted  for  a  time  a  monopoly.2 

Interesting   it    is    to    note   the  impression 

which  this  mercantile  system   made  on  the 

Contem-      minds  of  the  publicists  of  the  time.     Adam 

Viewsfof      Smith,   apostle  of  the   new  doctrine  of  free 

England's    trade,  admitted  that  England  was  less  illib- 

Commercial 

System  eral  than  other  nations  in  administering  the 
regulations,  common  to  all  nations  of  the  age, 
but  adds,  "It  can  not  be  very  difficult  to  de- 
termine who  have  been  the  contrivers  of  this 
whole  commercial  system;  not  the  consumer, 
we  may  believe,  whose  interest  has  been 
entirely  neglected,  but  the  producers  whose 
interest  has  been  so  carefully  attended  to; 
and  among  the  latter  class  our  merchants 
and  manufacturers  have  been  by  far  the 
principal  architects." 3  Montesquieu,  writing 
earlier,  in  1748,  was  in  favor  of  the  system, 

1S.  G.  Fisher,  The  Struggle  for  American  Independence,  I,  37. 

2  See  G.  L.  Beer,  Commercial  Policy,  pages  24-27,  for  discussion 
of  the  tobacco  monopoly  and  the  colonial  trade  with  Holland;  and 
Origin  of  the  British  Colonial  System,  pp.  108  ff. 

*  Adam  Smith,  Wealth  of  Nations,  bk.  IV,  chap,  viii,  3d  edition. 


ENGLISH  COMMERCIAL  SYSTEM  25 

because  "the  design  of  the  settlement  was  the 
extension  of  commerce  and  not  the  founding 
of  a  city  or  a  new  empire"  and  considered 
that  any  loss  to  a  colony,  was  "visibly  com- 
pensated by  the  protection  of  the  mother 
country  who  defends  it  by  her  arms  and  sup- 
ports it  by  her  laws."  1  The  view  of  Adam 
Smith  is  less  influenced  by  political  consider- 
ations and  the  evident  but  unexpressed  con- 
clusion is  that  the  whole  system  was  based 
on  economic  principles  that  would  not  make 
for  satisfactory  relations  between  two  peoples 
such  as  the  English  and  their  American  colo- 
nists. Montesquieu,  while  grasping  the  mo- 
tives which  led  to  the  colonization  of  America 
and  the  inception  of  the  colonial  policy,  failed 
to  recognize  the  nature  and  character  of  the 
people  in  America  and  the  spirit  which  they 
had  developed.  His  compensations  for  re- 
straint may  have  been  sound  theoretically  but, 
practically,  were  never  pressed  independently 
upon  the  minds  of  the  colonists  to  the  point 
where  they  might  be  deemed  material  com- 
pensations from  their  point  of  view.  The 
colonists  at  the  time  did  not  consider  as  "com- 

i  Montesquieu,  The  Spirit  of  the  Laws,  bk.  XXI,  chap.  xxi. 


26       SMUGGLING  IN  THE  AMERICAN  COLONIES 

pensations"  the  part  which  England  played  in 
the  colonial  defense  or  the  protection  to  shore 
and  shipping  which  the  British  navy  rendered. 
Rather,  they  looked  upon  the  privileges,  per- 
mitted by  the  paternal  system,  as  rights,  which 
they  should  enjoy  without  paying  an  extra 
price  for  them.1  In  America,  there  were  those 
who  believed  that  the  best  interests  of  the 
colonies  were  being  subserved  by  the  operation 
of  the  existing  system.2 

Such  a  system,  developed  through  a  cen- 
tury or  more,  by  acts  of  kings  and  parlia- 
ments, was  the  one  which  the  colonies  were 
expected  to  accept.  It  was  long  in  the  evo- 
lution, but  such  effect  as  it  had  on  the  period 
immediately  preceding  the  Revolution  was  as 
though  it  had  been  created  as  a  whole  at  that 
time. 

1  Cf.  G.  E.  Howard,  Preliminaries  of  the  Revolution,  63-67. 

z  See  Fisher,  Struggle  for  American  Independence,  45.  Also  James 
Otis,  The  Rights  of  the  British  Colonies  Asserted  and  Proved,  p.  58. 
Cf.  p.  76  (Memorial).  "The  validity  of  the  general  doctrine  that  the 
mother  country  and  not  foreigners  should  supply  the  colonies,  'pro- 
vided the  Mother  Country  can  and  does  supply  her  Plantations  with 
as  much  as  they  want,'  was  admitted  in  1762  by  the  Virginia  Com- 
mittee of  Correspondence  in  a  letter  to  the  colony's  agent  in  London." 
Beer,  Col.  Pol.,  207. 


CHAPTER  III 

THE     CAUSES     AND     CHARACTER     OF     COLONIAL 
SMUGGLING 

ALL  "illicit  trade"  and  "smuggling"  cannot 

"  Illicit 

be  grouped  in  one  class.  Wherever  laws  are  xrade  "  sig- 
laid  down  there  are  those  who  evade  them  if  n&t*™** 
possible  and  advantage  is  to  be  gained.  This 
is  especially  true  in  the  case  of  laws  requiring 
the  payment  of  duties.  But  unless  restrictive 
commercial  measures  are  opposed  to  some 
natural  and  essential  channel  of  commerce, 
the  evasion  of  them  is  of  little  significance 
except  in  so  far  as  it  illustrates  the  weakness 
of  administrative  officers  and  the  greed  of  the 
law-breakers  for  gain  acquired  by  any  means, 
foul  or  fair. 

In  general,   the  evasions   of   those  of  the  slight 
Acts  of  Trade  and  Navigation  which  aimed  to  ^P°rtance 

of  Evasions 
restrict  the   colonial  trade  to   England,   can  of  Acts 

probably  not  be  considered  as  of  prime  im-  colonial 

portance.     This  statement  is  based  principally  Trade  to 

England 

on  a  study  of  Sheffield's  "Observations  on  the 


28       SMUGGLING  IN  THE  AMERICAN  COLONIES 

Commerce  of  the  American  States."  Lord 
Sheffield  was  so  situated  that  he  had  access  to 
trustworthy  sources  of  information.  Although 
he  set  out  to  prove  that  the  trade  of  America 
would  naturally  go  to  England,  the  soundness 
of  his  reasons  and  reasonings  has  been  proven 
by  subsequent  developments.1 

Let  us  follow  Sheffield's  arguments  more 
closely.  He  sets  forth  a  list  of  commodities,2 
such  as  shoes,  stockings,  hats,  porcelain, 
woolens,  iron  and  steel  manufactures,  glass, 
earthenware,  painters'  colors,  and  other  minor 
articles,  comprising  nearly  all  the  staple  manu- 
factures demanded  by  the  American  market. 
Taking  up  each  item  separately,  he  shows 
clearly  that  there  could  be  but  little  competi- 

1  After  the  close  of  the  Revolution,  Lord  Sheffield  published  his 
"Observations  on  the  Commerce  of  the  American  States,"  in  which 
he  advised  against  the  admission  of  American  shipping  to  the  ports 
of  the  British  West  Indies.  In  his  introduction,  he  says,  "The  ques- 
tion between  us  amounts  only  to  this — Whether  the  British  West 
Indies  can  be  supplied  with  lumber  and  provisions  at  a  moderate 
price,  and  their  rum  find  a  market  without  the  admission  of  foreign 
shipping  into  our  Colonies?  and  whether  the  British  dominions  can 
maintain  shipping  sufficient  for  their  trade  and  supplies?  The  ques- 
tion is  not,  at  present,  whether  the  British  dominions  can  supply 
the  British  West  Indies;  but  whether  all  the  world  can  supply  them  in 
British  shipping?"  Intro.,  page  xiii.  Theory  plays  but  a  small  part 
in  his  argument.  The  facts  and  statistics  he  uses  include  the 
period  preceding  the  Revolution. 

2  Op.  cit.,  6th  edition,  1784,  pp.  7-36. 


CAUSES  AND  CHARACTER  29 

tion  for  the  British  dealers  in  these  commodi- 
ties in  the  American  market.    The  figures  of 
Macpherson,  though  referring  to    the    ante-  England 
bellum  period  of  restriction,  may  be  cited  in  Trading 

this  connection.     In   1769,   the   official  total  place  for 

Colonies 

value  of  imports  into  the  colonies  was  £2,623,- 
412,  of  which  £1,064,975  were  from  Great 
Britain  and  £789,754  were  from  the  West 
Indies.  The  value  of  the  importations  from 
Africa  was  about  £150,000,  consisting  prin- 
cipally of  slaves  and  therefore  negligible  in 
this  discussion.  There  remained  then  only 
£76,000  from  "the  South  of  Europe." l  Shef- 
field next  takes  up  the  group  of  merchandise  in 
which  "there  may  be  competition."  2  These, 
such  as  cheap  tea,  paper,  silks,  and  fine  linens, 
he  asserts  usually  come  to  America  through 
England,  and  Macpherson  gives  corroborating 
testimony  by  his  citing  the  fact  that  of  the 
great  quantity  of  linen  imported  into  London  in 
1731,  from  Holland  and  Germany,  "the  great- 
est part  is  again  exported  to  our  plantations 
in  America,  and  our  factories  in  Africa, etc."3 
Reasons  are  given  below  for  the  course 

1 D.  Macpherson,  Annals  of  Commerce,  III,  571-572. 
2  Op.  cit.,  pp.  36-54.  3  op.  cit.,  Ill,  182. 


30       SMUGGLING  IN  THE  AMERICAN  COLONIES 

which  trade  in  these  goods  took;  first,  how- 
ever, we  may  notice  some  of  the  infractions  of 
the  English  monopoly  which  took  place. 

Traders  from  Dutch  ports  were  the  chief 
offenders  in  the  matter  of  illegal  tea  importa- 
tion into  the  colonies.  One  of  their  methods 
was  to  clear  for  some  Dutch  colony  with  an 
American  port  named  as  a  port-of-call.  Their 
official  papers  would  then  protect  them  in  a 
measure  in  their  operations  at  the  American 
port.  Another  method  was  for  British  vessels 
from  Holland  to  enter  but  a  part  of  their  cargo 
with  the  custom-house  officers  at  some  British 
port,  thus  paying  duty  on  a  small  part  only 
of  their  cargo,  while  they  "landed  their  entire 
Dutch  Tea  cargoes  in  the  colonies." 1  The  tea  thus  smug- 
Smuggling  gje(j  m  was  Of  a  cheap  variety  that  the  Eng- 
lish merchants  seldom  handled  and  they,  as 
a  rule,  felt  themselves  secure  in  the  control 
of  the  market  for  the  better  grade  of  teas. 
Much  has  been  made  of  the  tea  smuggling  of 
the  colonies,  but  G.  L.  Beer  comes  to  the  con- 
clusion that  the  tea  consumption  has  been 
much  over-estimated  and  that,  therefore,  the 
disparity  in  the  amount  of  tea  said  to  have 

k  X     1  Beer»  CoL  Po1-'  PP-  243  f- 


CAUSES  AND   CHARACTER  31 

been  consumed  and  the  amount  legally  im- 
ported from  Great  Britain,  lacks  the  signifi- 
cance usually  attached  to  it.1 

Some  French  manufactures  were  smuggled 
into  the  colonies  from  the  French  islands,  in 
connection  with  the  trade  presently  to  be  de- 
scribed, but  it  is  doubtful  whether  their 
amount  was  great. 
^England's  position  in  the  mercantile  world  Advantages 

had  become  a  dominant  one  and  to  her  came  2,  ,ng  1S 

____ —— — — — — ——————  Forts 

the  products  of all  parts  of  the  world. 
American  Vessels  seeking^general  cargoes  would 
find  them  more  easily  in  the  ports  of  England 
than  in  the  ports  of  any  other  nation.  Fur- 
thermore, British  merchants  were  more  dis- 
posed to  give  long  credit  to  American  mer- 
chants than  were  other  foreign  business  men. 
The  principal  reason,  however,  to  cause  the 
trade  of  the  colonies  in  many  of  the  above 
mentioned  articles  to  go  to  England  was  the 
accepted  fact  that  England  could  produce 
better  quality  at  a  lower  price. 

Macpherson's  figures,  quoted  above,  es- 
tablish the  fact  that,  either  in  spite  of,  or 
because  of,  natural  tendencies,  the  colonists 

1  G.  L.  Beer,  British  Colonial  Policy,  245  f,  note  2. 


32       SMUGGLING  IN  THE  AMERICAN  COLONIES 

v  did  get  their  legal  imports  chiefly  from  Eng- 
Growth  I  land.  For  this  there  could  have  been  but  two 
Between  \explanations:  first,  that  they  found  it  to  their 

England      (advantage   from   a   business   standpoint;   or, 

and  Colo-  .  .  . 

nies  Due  to  second,    they   felt    constrained   to   do   so   on 

Natural       Wccount   of   the   regulations   of   the    Acts  of 
Causes          \_  .        . 

Trade   and   Navigation.     Lord   Sheffield,    as 

—  Trustworthy  as  any  contemporary  observer, 
says,  "The  preference  formerly  given  (to 
England)  was  not  the  effect  of  our  restrictions ; 
nothing  was  easier  to  the  Americans  than  to 
evade  them ;  and  it  is  well  known  that  from  the 
first,  *  *  they  uniformly  did  evade  them  when- 
ever they  found  it  to  their  interest."1  Moral 
scruples  had  no  more  weight  with  the  colonists 
in  connection  with  the  general  import  trade 
than  they  had  in  connection  with  the  West 
Indies  trade  and  we  shall  see  that  smuggling 
existed  in  the  latter  whenever  the  colonists 
found  it  to  their  advantage.  We  may  there- 
fore eliminate,  to  a  large  degree,  the  trade  regu- 
lations as  a  coercing  lorce  in  the  JKngEsh  trade 
with  the  colonies. 

Many  great  staples  which  England  produced 
had  overcome  French,  German,  and  Dutch 

1  Op.  cit.,  234. 


CAUSES  AND  CHARACTER  33 

competitors  in  their  home  markets  and  it  is 
reasonable  to  assume  that  the  Americans 
would  find  it  to  their  advantage  to  buy  from 
the  same  producers.  Even  during  and  after 
the  Revolution  the  advantage  of  trading  in 
England  was  so  great  that  James  Madison 
wrote  in  1785,  "Our  Merchants  are  almost  all 
connected  with  that  country  and  that  only."  1 

We    must   therefore    reiterate   our   former^ 
statement  that,  in  all  probability,  the^g 
of  those  Acts  of  Trade  and  Navigation  which 
purposed  to  confine  so  much  of  the  colonial) 
import  trade  to  England,   was  of   compara- 
tively minor  significance  only  in  the  develop- 
ment of  the  revolutionary  spirit  of  the  colo- 
nists.   Of  course,  exceptional  cases  existed  but 
they  are  traceable  usually  to  special  causes  of 
slight  general  importance.     Probably  the  total 
amount  of  merchandise  smuggled  in,  in  con- 
nection with  the  European  trade,  was  but 
small  part  of  the  total  volume  of  busines 

In  our  discussion  of  the  development  of 
England's  commercial  system,  we  have  pur- 
posely failed  to  mention  the  Molasses  Act,  Molasses 
passed  in   1733.     As  an  efficient  restrictive    ct 

James  Madison,  "Works,"  I,  156;  Writings,  Hunt's  ed.,  II,  147. 


* 


34       SMUGGLING  IN  THE  AMERICAN  COLONIES 

measure,  its  influence  was  naught;  as  anin- 
centive  to   illicit  trade,   its   importance   was 
gr^eater  than  that  of  any  other  trade  regu- 
latmgjact,  and  it  is   itsevasion  principally 
rather  than  its  effect  on  legitimate  commerce 
that   we    are    now    to    consider.      From    the 
very  nature  of  the   commerce    at   which   it 
struck,  its  observance  would  have  been  well- 
nigh  impossible.     Briefly,  the  Molasses  Act 
/  laid  prohibitive  duties  upon  the  importation 
from    the    foreign    Sugar    Islands    into    the 
\  American  colonies  of  rum,  molasses,  and  sugar.1 
We  have  seen  that  the  chief  products  of 
the  New  England  colonies  were  lumber  and 
fish,  and  of  the  Middle  colonies,  agricultural 
Disadvan-  staples.     These  two  sections,  especially  the 
Exporting   ^ormer»    were    also    great    ship-building    and 
staples  to   ship-owning  centers.     Of  their  products,  part 
went  to  England,  but  the    market  was  re- 
stricted, for,  during  the  reign  of  Charles  II, 
statutes  were  passed  in  behalf  of  the  British 
farmers,  practically  prohibiting  the  importa- 
tion of  grain  and  meat  into  England,  and  the 

1" Molasses  Act  was  to  continue  in  force  £ve  years;  but  it  was 
five  times  renewed  and  by  the  Sugar  Act  of  1764  was  made  per- 
petual." Macdonald,  Documentary  Source  Book  of  American  His- 
tory, 1908. 


CAUSES  AND  CHARACTER  35 

demand  there  for  fish  and  lumber  was  not 
great  enough  to  equal  the  supply.  There  re- 
mained a  vast  unconsumed  surplus  in  the 
hands  of  the  colonists  for  which,  again,  in  the 
British  West  Indies,  there  was  not  a  sufficient 
demand. 

Of  the  courses  then  opeii  to  the  colonists,  Alternative 

Courses 

either  was  likely  to  involve  legal  difficulties,  open 
First,  they  could  manufacture  for  themselves, 
— a  procedure  not  only  legally  restricted1  but 
economically  unwise  if  not  impossible.  Second, 
they  could  export  to  a  third  market,  which 
was  both  a  natural  and  a  ready  market — the 
foreign  West  Indies  islands — but  from  which 
a  return  cargo  was  by  the  Molasses  Act  sought 
to  be  interdicted.  The  second  course  was  the 
one  adopted  and  the  reasons  seem  to  justify  Selection 
the  selection. 

The    colonies    depended    on    England    for 

f  their  manufactured  goods,  but  the  value  of 
the  products  exported  in  return  always  left 
tEe  balance  of  trade  in  favor  of  Englajid . 
Money  was  therefore  essential  and  enough  of 

\     it  could  not  be  obtained  in  the  British  West 

1  10  and  11  William  III,  chap.  X.,  19;  5  George  II,  chap.  XXII; 
23  George  II,  chap.  XXIX. 


36       SMUGGLING  IN  THE  AMERICAN  COLONIES 

Indies.  The  foreign  islands  were  eager  for 
the  colonial  products  and  had  an  abundance 
01  money  which  their  direct  tra3ingwith 
Europe  yielded.  From  them,  and  from  the 
trade  irom  the  south  of  Europe,  j5reSerrt4y-=4o 
be  rufuired  *e,  the  colonists  obtained  the 
needed  specie.  But  still  more  from  the  Is- 
lands  they  obtained  those  products  on  which 
Colonists  •  -obtaining  their  specie  ultimately  depended. 


Could         rpjie  rum   an(j  j.ne  moiasses  which  the  Boston 

Secure 

Needed  and  Rhode  Island  distilleries  soon  made  into 
Only  on  the  rum,  were  re-exported  to  Africa  and  in  return 
Basis  of  the  were  brought  back  great  numbers  of  slaves. 

West  Indies 

Trade  The  slave  market,  both  of  the  Islands  and  of 
the  Southern  American  colonies,  was  never 
over-supplied.  Slave  labor  was  of  the  greatest 
moment  in  the  production  of  the  South  's 
great  staples.  Rum  was  practically  the  only 
commodity  that  could  have  been  exchanged 
for  the  African  slaves  and  it  is  in  this  consid- 
eration that  the  Southern  colonies  became  de- 
pendent on  the  trade  between  the  Northern  col- 
onies and  the  West  Indies,  British  and  foreign. 
The  money  derived  from  the  West  Indies 
trade  did  not  long^  remain  in  America,  for  the 
\  balance  of  tradejetweeo  Englandj.nd^Amer- 


CAUSES  AND  CHARACTER  37 

ica  was,  as  stated  above,  always  in  favor  of 
England  and  to  a  very  large  degree.  No  divi- 
sion of  opinion  among  contemporary  or  mod- 
ern writers  is  discernible  on  this  point. 
Golden,  in  1723,  asserted  that  money  coming 
from  the  West  Indies  "seldom  continues  six 
months  in  the  Province,  before  it  is  remitted 
for  England."1  He  carried  his  later  obser- 
vations to  the  logical  conclusion  by  declaring, 
in  1764,  "It  is  evident  to  a  demonstration  Of  Money 

that  the  more  Trade  the  Colonies   in  North  Derived 

-— _ —  — . —  from  West 

America  have  with  the  Foreign  Colonies,  the  indies 
more  they  consume  of  the  British  Manufac-  ra  e 
tures."2  Franklin's  explanation  of  the  differ- 

1  Documents  relative  to  the  Colonial  History  of  New  York,  V,  686. 

1  Ibid.  VII,  612.  In  1767,  Dennis  de  Berdt,  agent  for  Massa- 
chussetts  in  London,  presented  a  memorial  to  the  Board  of  Trade, 
in  which  he  said,  "To  put  any  difficulties  on  the  American  Trade, 
will  inevitably  diminish  our  exports  to  that  Country,  from  their  in- 
ability to  pay  the  Merchants  for  the  Manufactures  imported  by 
them,  which  inability  will  be  the  same  whether  the  people  in  Amer- 
ica resolve  to  take  goods  or  not."  A.  B.  Hart,  History  told  by  Con- 
temporaries, II,  No.  146;  quoting  from  "Papers  relating  to  Public 
Events  in  Massachusetts  preceding  the  Revolution  (1856)." 

Compare  argument  of  John  Ashley,  a  Barbados  planter,  who,  in  a 
pamphlet,  "Some  Observations  on  a  direct  exportation  of  sugar  from  the 
British  Islands,  in  a  letter  from  a  gentleman  in  Barbadoes  to  his  friend 
in  London"  (Dec.  21,  1734)  writes,  "The  Planters  will  never  want  a 
Supply  of  British  Goods  when  they  have  the  wherewithal  to  pay 
for  them;  and  the  more  Markets  they  have  to  take  off  their  Products, 
the  better  able  will  they  be  to  pay  for  what  they  want,  and  the  more 
they  will  take  off;  and  such  Supplies  will  come  from  Great -Britain, 


4.17869 


38       SMUGGLING  IN  THE  AMERICAN  COLONIES 

ence  in  the  value  of  the  English  commodities 
imported  into  Pennsylvania,  £500,000,  and 
the  value  of  those  articles  exported  directly  to 
England,  £40,000,  was  that  the  balance  due 
England  was  made  up  by  the  trade  with  the 
English,  French,  Spanish,  Dutch,  and  Danish 
West  Indies;  and  this  explanation  may  be 
considered  as  typical  for  the  New  England 
colonies  as  well. 

On  their  side  of  the  case,  the  French 
Islands  were  prohibited  from  sending  rum 
to  France  for  fear  of  interfering  with  the 
French  brandy  trade.  As  it  was  essential 
for  the  islanders  to  dispose  of  their  greatest 
product,  rum,  and  particularly  molasses,  be- 
came the  chief  articles  offered  on  advantageous 
terms  in  exchange  for  the  products  of  the 
North. 

t —  Of  equal  force  was  the  economic  necessity 
J  which  compelled  the  continental  colonies  to 
/  export    to    the    foreign    West    Indies.     This 
arose  principally  from  the  nature  of  the  com- 
modities produced.     Disregarding  the  influ- 

some  how  or  other,  and  in  Time,  either  the  Planters  will  send  Effects 
to  their  Factors  in  Great-Britain  for  them,  or  they  will  buy  them  of 
the  British  Merchants'  Factors  in  the  Islands,  as  they  find  most  for 
their  Convenience  and  Advantage."  op.  cit.,  page  17. 


CAUSES  AND  CHARACTER  39 

ence  of  the  legal  hindrances  to  European 
trade  noted  -akoye.  we  may  assume  that  the 
supply  of  commodities  would  have  sought  the 

market  where  there  was  the  greatest  demand. 

r—  - 

The    following    statistics    show    conclusive!^  West 
that  the  demand  of  the  West  Indies  was  fa 


in  excess  of  that  of  England.     New  England  *&*  Only 
-  i  -  T~T  -  1  -  •  —  \i    Adequate 

sent  to  the  Islands,  in  1770,  staves  and  heaa-  Market 
ings  and  hoops  for  barrels  and  hogsheads  to  tire  °pen.to  ***[ 


value  of  about  £70,000,  or  about  three  times  as 
much  as  was  sent  to  England.  Bread  and  flour, 
principally  from  Pennsylvania,  to  the  amount 
of  23,449  tons  were  exported  to  the  Islands 
in  comparison  with  263  tons  sent  to  England. 
In  the  shipping  of  fish,  we  find  that,  of  the 
better,  dried  fish,  431,386  quintals  went  to  the 
south  of  Europe,  legally  permissible,  206,081 
quintals  to  the  West  Indies,  and  only  22,086 
to  Great  Britain.  Of  the  products  of  the  fish- 

of  Fisheries 

cries,  however,  there  remained  a  great  quan- 
tity of  low  grade  pickled  fish  which  could  find 
an  adequate  market  only  in  the  West  Indies, 
which  consumed  29,582  barrels  of  a  total 
30,06s.1  In  1778,  John  Adams  observed, 

1  Pitkin,  Statistical  View,  2nd  ed.,  1817,  table  II,  furnishes  these 
figures. 


40       SMUGGLING  IN  THE  AMERICAN  COLONIES 

"One  part  (the  low  grade)  of  our  fish  went  to 
the  West  Indies  for  rum,  and  molasses  to  be 
distilled  into  rum,  which  injured  our  health 
and  our  morals;  the  other  part  (the  high 
grade)  went  to  Spain  and  Portugal  for  gold 
and  silver,  almost  the  whole  of  which  went 
to  London." l  It  is  readily  seen  that  the 
profit  of  the  fisheries  was  dependent  on  a 
market  for  the  whole  catch,  and  that  if  the 
foreign  West  Indies  market  had  been  taken 
away,  the  success  of  the  whole  business  would 
(^Fisheries  ^ave  been  jeopardized.  Minot  states  the 
Dependent  possible  result  of  this,  succinctly,  in  the  fol- 
indies  lowing,  "The  business  of  the  fishery  *  *  was 
Trade  at  this  time  estimated  at  £164,000  per  annum; 
the  vessels  employed  in  it,  which  would  be 
nearly  useless,  at  £100,000;  the  provisions 
used  in  it,  the  casks  for  packing  fish,  and  other 
articles,  at  £22,700  and  upwards;  to  all  of 
which  there  was  to  be  added  the  loss  of  the 
advantage  of  sending  lumber,  horses,  provi- 
sions and  other  commodities  to  the  foreign 
plantations  as  cargoes,  *  *  and  the  dismissing 
of  5,000  seamen  from  their  employment." 2 

1  Sparks,  Diplomatic  Correspondence  of  the  Revolution,  IV,  273. 
1  G.  R.  Minot,  History  of  Massachusetts,  II,  147,  quoting  from  the 
arguments  of  Mauduit,  the  agent  of  Massachusetts  in  England. 


CAUSES  AND  CHARACTER  41 

Except  for  the  indirect  advantage  in  con- 
nection with  the  supply  of  slaves,  noted  above, 
and  which  should  not  be  underemphasized, 
the   dependence   of   the    Carolinas,    Virginia, 
and   the   other   Southern    colonies   upon   the  situation 
West   Indies   trade   was   not   of  importance.  ^^J^*™ 
Their  great  natural  products,  rice  and  tobacco,  Different 
except  during  short  intervals,  were  afforded 
by  law  markets  that  were  extensive  enough 
to  demand  all  their  surplus  production,  and 
from  these   markets   they   could   draw  back 
money  or  manufactured  goods   in  exchange. 
The  balance  of  trade  being  more  nearly  equal, 
their  demand  for  gold   and  silver  could  be 
supplied  without  recourse  to  the  West  Indies. 
-To  interfere,  however,  with  the  trade  that  was 
being  carried  on  between  the  foreign   West 
Indies   islands    and   the   northern   American 
colonies    would    have    been    an    interruption 
fraught  with  the  gravest  results.     From  the 
very  nature  of  the  commodities  most  promi- 
nent in  the  trade  and  from  the  geographical 
position  of  the  two  sections,  the  one  party  Molasses 
in  the  transactions  supplied  the  only  possible  Reniains 
adequate    market    for    the    products    of    the  Unenforced 
other  party,  while,  in  the  situation,  the  mate- 


42       SMUGGLING  IN  THE  AMERICAN  COLONIES 

rial  life  and  growth  of  each  was  largely  depend- 
ent on  what  it  received  from  the  other. l  Had 
the  markets  of  Europe  been  wholly  unre- 
stricted, the  larger  ships  required  and  the  diffi- 
culty of  the  voyage  would  have  served  as 
hindrances  to  trade,  while  these  hindrances 
were  almost  entirely  lacking  in  trade  between 
the  Islands  and  America.  As  the  Molasses 
Act  remained  unenforced,  this  natural  trade 
was  allowed  to  develope  to_the  fullest,_and 
each  year's  non-enforcement  wasmaking  more 
difficuTf  the  situation  whicETthe  Britisl 
Jtoms-ofiicia:ls  had  Lu  faTeTTmally,  in  1763.  It 
is  a  question  whether  the  term"^srnuggling^_ 


TVfnTflysHs   Ai'rTlifltnppirrrgfl  prpvinnstn  that 
time,  iimsmudr'asTwith  the  exception  of  a 

1  A  concise  statement  of  the  interdependence  of  the  North  American 
and  West  Indies  trade  is  given  as  follows  by  Governor  Pownall; 
"The  West  India  islands  produce  sugar,  molasses,  cotton,  etc.; 
they  want  the  materials  for  building  and  mechanics,  and  many  the 
necessaries  of  food  and  raiment:  The  lumber,  hides,  the  fish,  flour, 
provisions,  live-stock,  and  horses,  produced  in  the  northern  colonies 
on  the  continent,  must  supply  the  islands  with  these  requisites.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  sugar  and  molasses  of  the  sugar  islands  is  become 
a  necessary  intermediate  branch  of  the  North  American  trade  and 
fisheries.  The  produce  of  the  British  sugar  islands  cannot  supply 
both  Great  Britain  and  North  America  with  the  necessary  quantity; 
this  makes  the  molasses  of  the  foreign  sugar  islands  also  necessary  to 
the  present  state  of  the  North  American  trade."  Thomas  Pownall, 
Administration  of  the  Colonies,  4th  Edition,  1768,  London,  pp.  5  f . 


CAUSES  AND  CHARACTER  43 

brief  period  of  activity  about  1760  custom- 
houses ignored  or  winked  at  the  importations 
from  the  West  Indies.  This  long  non-enforce- 
ment of  the  act  directed  against  the  natural 
trade  of  the  colonies,  enables  Mellen  Chamber- 
lain to  present  the  position  of  the  colonists 
when  the  enforcement  of  the  Sugar  Act  was 
imminent,  in  these  words,  "The  other  party 
(the  colonists),  basing  their  claim  on  natural 
equity  and  long  enjoyment,  wished  to  retain 
it  (the  West  Indies  trade)."  l 

The  duties  2  which  the  Molasses  Act  sought 
to  levy  on  imports  to  the  colonies  from  the 
foreign  West  Indies  were  such  as  to  have  the 
effect  of  an  absolute  prohibition  of  trade  be-  interests 
tween    them.     They    were    intended    to    be  West 


regulative  and  not  revenue-producing.     The 

--  ^  Considered 

sole  raison  d'etre  of  the  act  was  to  protect  the  of  Greater 

QT"Th^^ 


fact  that  they  operated  to  the  disadvantage  of  American 
of  the  British  colonies  in  North  America  to 
an  infinitely  greater  degree  did  not  alter  the 
determination  of  the  framers  of  the  act,  al- 

"J  1  J.  Winsor,  Narrative  and  Critical  History  of  America,  VI,  23-24. 

J  The  duties  which  the  Molasses  Act  sought  to  levy  were,  —  On 
rum  and  spirits,  9d.  per  gallon;  on  molasses  and  syrups,  6d.  per 
gallon;  on  sugars,  5s.  per  cwt. 


44       SMUGGLING  IN  THE  AMERICAN  COLONIES 


Reasons 
for  Favors 
Shown 
British 
Islands 


though  it  is  open  to  conjecture  whether  the 
recognition  of  this  fact  did  not  furnish  partial 
grounds  for  the  non-enforcement  of  the  act. 
Perhaps,  too,  a  tardy  realization  of  the  fact 
that  its  enforcement  would  lead  to  a  lessening 
of  the  ability  of  the  Americans  to  purchase 
from  English  merchants  was  of  some  weight 
in  the  non-enforcement.  England  always  con- 
sidered the  interest  of  the  British  islands  as 
of  greater  importance  than  that  of  her  North 
American  possessions.  The  Islands  were 
deemed  economically  much  more  useful  to 
the  mother  country  by  reason  of  the  nature  of 
their  resources.  The  great  plantations  were 
owned  by  English  gentlemen  most  of  whom 
resided  in  England  and  who  were  in  close 
touch  with  the  government  and  thus  more 
likely  to  have  their  complaints  listened  to. 
We  may  again  quote  Beer,  who  gives  as  the 
standard  by  which  England  measured  the 
value  of  her  colonies,  the  ability  of  the  colony 
to  "produce  commodities  that  the  mother 
country  would  otherwise  have  to  buy  from 
foreigners."  "  Hence  greater  stress  was  laid  on 
colonies  as  sources  of  supply  than  as  markets 
for  British  manufacturers."  Judged  by  this 


CAUSES  AND  CHARACTER  45 

standard,  the  West  Indies,  except  for  naval  Standards 
supplies,  would  rank  as  much  more  important  coionia?m 
than  the  continental,  especially  the  Northern,  Values 
colonies.     Bancroft  describes  the  commercial 
activity  of  the  West  Indies  as  that  of  "bees 
carrying  all  their  honey  to   England."     This 
method  of  comparing  colonial  values  was  in 
vogue  at  the  time  of  the  passage  of  the  Molas- 
ses Act  and  continued  until  about  1763,  when 
England  began  to  esteem  her  manufacturing 
interests    more   highly   and    to   consider   the 
colony  affording  the  best  market  as  the  one 
deserving  of  the  greater  consideration.     Of 
this   somewhat   altered   view   the   dictum   of 
Sheffield,  above  cited,  is  evidence. 

Nowhere  was  there  a  keener  realization  of 
the  favored  position  of  the  West  Indies  than 
in  the  Islands  themselves,  and  among  those 
financially  interested  in  them.  This  sense 
of  security  in  governmental  favor  reached 
such  a  point  that  the  attempt  was  actually 

made  first  to  prohibit  in  terms  most  of  the  „ 

Efforts  of 

trade  of  the  North  American  colonies  with  the  .the  British 
foreign    islands.     A    bill    towards    this    end 


passed  the  House  of   Commons  but  memo-  Confine 

Trade  to 

rials  to  the  House  of  Lords  by  the  colonial  Themseive* 


46       SMUGGLING  IN  THE  AMERICAN  COLONIES 

assemblies  prevented  its  final  passage.1  The 
question  of  why  the  Molasses  Act  remained 
unenforced  is  one  principally  of  conjecture 
unless  we  seek  the  explanation  in  the  weak 
organization  of  the  customs  service.  Since 
1696,  the  Board  of  Trade  and  Plantations  was 
in  general  charge  of  colonial  affairs.  It  was  a 
sub-committee  of  the  Privy  Council.  The 
Board  received  most  of  its  information  from 
the  governors  of  the  provinces,  who  were  be- 
tween two  fires  in  the  matter  of  giving  in- 
formation concerning  evasions  of  law.  The 
governors  and  the  two  Surveyors-General  of 
Organize-  Customs,2 North  and  South,  were  assisted  in  the 
Customs  administration  of  the  laws  by  the  "naval 
Semce  officers"  and  the  collectors,  with  surveyors  and 
searchers  at  each  principal  port.  The  personnel 
of  the  service  at  best  was  one  hardly  com- 
manding much  respect.  The  collectorships  were 
sometimes  delegated,  the  appointees  remaining 
in  England  and  entrusting  the  actual  work  to 
deputies.  While  the  collectors  were  never 

1  Pennsylvania  Archives.     Series  IV,  Vol.  I,  pp.  482  f.  and  493  ff. 

1  Good  accounts  of  the  organization  of  the  customs  service  are 
found  in  Scharf  &  Westcott's  History  of  Philadelphia,  III,  1800,  ff.,  in 
G.  E.  Howard,  Preliminaries  of  the  Revolution,  72,  and  in  G.  L.  Beer, 
British  Commercial  Policy,  pages  123  ff. 


CAUSES  AND  CHARACTER  47 

popular,  it  is  significant  that  acts  of  violence 
were  uncommon  before  1755  and  reached  their 
worst  after  1763. 

It  was  only  with  the  connivance  of  the 
custom-house  officials  that  much  of  the  illegal 
trade  was  possible.  The  connivance  is,  how- 
ever, greatly  illuminated  by  the  discretionary- 
power  conferred  upon  the  collectors  by  a 
statute  of  Charles  II,1  to  accept  partial  pay- 
ment of  the  statutory  duties  as  full  payment. 
The  methods,  however,  employed  by  the  smug- 
glers were  legion,  false  clearance  papers,  par- 
tial entries,  and  mis-labeled  packages  being  Connivance 
some  of  the  ways  by  which  illicit  entry  was 
made  by  the  larger  vessels.  The  bays  and 
rivers  afforded  ample  opportunities  for  the 
smaller  vessels  to  run  in  their  entire  cargoes 
without  detection.  Governor  Bernard  of 
Massachusetts  wrote  in  1764,  "If  conniving  at 
foreign  sugars  and  molasses  and  Portugal 
wines  and  fruits  is  to  be  reckoned  corruption, 
there  never  was,  I  believe,  an  uncorrupt  custom 
officer  in  America  until  within  twelve  months." 
From  the  same  source  we  have  the  following 
statement  concerning  the  15,000  hogsheads  of 

1 13  and  14  Ch.  II,  c.  11,  §§  xvii,  xviii. 


f 


48       SMUGGLING  IN  THE  AMERICAN  COLONIES 

molasses  imported  into  Massachusetts  in  1763, 
"all  of  which,  except  less  than  500,  came  from 
Ports  which  are  now  Foreign."1  It  was  esti- 
mated that  the  duty  on  molasses,  if  collected, 
would  amount  to  £25,000  a  year.2  For  the 
officials,  however,  it  should  be  said  that  smug- 
gling was  a  less  heinous  crime  in  those  days 
than  later.  In  England  there  existed  a  great 
system  of  illicit  trade  with  which  were  believed 
Attitude  to  be  connected  "gentlemen  of  rank  and 

Toward  .  . 

Smuggling    character  in  London.         In  America,  the  long 

in  England  iaxjty  m  enforcement  of  the  Molasses  Act  led 

and 

America  to  its  being  considered  as  a  dead  letter  and 
with  its  evasions  are  connected  such  names  as 
that  of  Fanueil]4  in  Boston. 

The  violation  of  trade  regulations  in  con- 
nection with  the  West  Indies  trade,  that  resulted 
in  the  most  serious  and  momentous  conse- 
Contraband  quences  arose  at  the  time  of  the  Seven  Years' 
Trade  with  War    between    England    and    France.     The 
American   colonies   and   the   French   islands 

1  From  Quincy's  Mass.  Reports,  pp.  423  f.,  and  Bernard's  Select 
Letters  on  the  Trade  and  Government  of  America  in  the  years  1763-1768, 
p.  10. 

2  John  Adams,  Works,  X,  348. 
1  Fisher,  Op.  cit.,  51. 

4  W.  B.  Weeden,  Economic  and  Social  History  of  New  England,  II, 
620;  cf.  pp.  612  and  627  f. 


CAUSES  AND   CHARACTER  49 

had  become  so  interdependent  that  at  the  out- 
break of  hostilities  between  their  mother 
countries,  the  commercial  intercourse  between 
them  did  not  cease,  notwithstanding  the  fact 
that  at  the  beginning  of  the  war  distinct 
measures  were  passed  by  both  the  colonial 
and  the  Home  governments  to  break  up  the 
trade.1  Finally,  in  1757,  after  having  been 
urged  to  put  the  colonial  food-products  into 
"the  enumeration,"  Parliament  forbade,  dur- 
ing the  period  of  the  war,  the  export  of  any 
food  supplies,  except  fish  and  rice,  to  any  place 
outside  the  British  dominions.  The  French 
were  entirely  dependent  upon  the  northern 
products  for  their  chief  food  supplies.  The 
American  colonies  were  called  upon  to  supply 
financial  aid  for  England  2  which  was  waging 
war  principally  in  their  behalf,  and  the  colo- 
nies needed  then,  if  ever,  the  West  Indies  trade 
from  which  they  drew  their  chief  profit  and 
so  much  of  their  specie.  Although  the  con- 

1  For  the  interesting  acts  of  the  colonial  assemblies,  see  Beer,  Colo" 
nial  Policy,  pp.  77  f. 

2  The  preamble  to  the  "Sugar  Act"  states  that  the  revenues, 
prescribed  by  it,  are  levied  because  "it  is  just  and  necessary,  that  a 
Revenue  be  raised  in"  his  American  colonies  "for  defraying  the 
Expenses  of  defending,  protecting,  and  securing  the  same." — 4  George 
III,  chap.  xv. 


50       SMUGGLING  IN  THE  AMERICAN  COLONIES 

tinuance  of  the  trade  by  the  Americans  may 

have  indicated  a  break  in  the  sympathy  of  the 

colonies  with  England,  it  is  fair  to  conjecture 

Motives  at   that  a  desire  for  business  profits  and  the  eco- 

the  Bottom  .  .         .  ,  .  .      , 

of  Contra-  nomic  necessity  for  the  continuance  of  the 
band  Trade  trade,  were  the  motives  at  bottom.  This 
trade  with  the  enemy  wras  carried  on  in  two 
ways:  either  with  the  French  directly  under 
"Flags  of  Truce,"  or  indirectly  through  the 
neutral  islands  of  other  nations. 

The  "Flags  of  Truce  "  were  originally  issued 

"jFlagsof     by  the  colonial  governors  for  the  purpose  of 
Truce 

allowing  vessels  to  exchange  prisoners  with 
the  French.  This  system  had  already  begun 
in  the  earlier  wars  of  the  century.  Many 
abuses  of  the  system  arose.  With  the  pris- 
oners was  carried  merchandise  which  was  also 
exchanged,  and  when  the  exchange  of  prisoners 
was  effected,  the  permits  were  not  surrendered 
but  were  used  for  subsequent  expeditions. 
Pennsylvania  was  perhaps  the  worst  offender 
in  the  abuse  of  this  practice.  Governor  Denny 
publicly  sold  these  permits  to  the  highest 
bidders  and  there  was  such  a  large  number  of 
ships  engaged  in  this  trade  that  James  Ham- 
ilton, Lieutenant-Governor,  on  information  of 


CAUSES  AND  CHARACTER  51 

Sir  Jeffrey  Amherst  that  provisions  were 
being  collected  in  Philadelphia  to  send  to  the 
French  fleet  and  army  in  the  West  Indies,  di- 
rected the  Collector  of  Customs  at  Philadel- 
phia to  hold  there  all  ships  except  those  re- 
leased by  special  warrant.1  Rhode  Island  was 
second  only  to  Pennsylvania  in  making  pos- 
sible the  violations  of  the  privileges  of  the 
"Flags  of  Truce."  In  Virginia,  the  Lieuten- 
ant-Governor was  offered  four  hundred  guin- 
eas if  he  "would  license  a  Flag  of  Truce,"  but 
he  refused  the  offer.2 

The  ease  with  which  the  indirect  trade  with  indirect 
the  French  was  conducted  was  greatly  en-  the  French 
hanced  by  the  practice  of  the  European  nations 
of  allowing  the  commerce  of  certain  ports  in 
their  West  Indies  possessions  to  be  free  to 
the  whole  world.  Holland  had  as  a  "free 
port"  the  island  of  St.  Eustatius,  Denmark 
allowed  to  St.  Thomas  entire  commercial 
freedom,  while  France  and  England  possessed 
such  ports  in  St.  Domingo,  and  in  Jamaica 
and  Dominica.  The  evident  purpose  of  such 

1  Pennsylvania  Archives,  Series  IV,  Vol.  Ill,  144.     A  general  em* 
bargo  was  laid  by  Pennsylvania  to  break  up  the  "Flag  of  Truce" 
trade,  but  it  was  of  short  duration. 

2  G.  L.  Beer,  British  Colonial  Policy,  90. 


52       SMUGGLING  IN  THE  AMERICAN  COLONIES 

a  feature  in  an  otherwise  stringent  system  was 
to  make  possible  the  drawing  away  of  trade 
from  commercial  rivals.  The  purpose  was 
undoubtedly  accomplished  but,  at  the  same 
time,  smuggling  was  greatly  abetted  thereby, 
and  the  Dutch  and  Spanish  became  inter- 
mediaries in  the  illicit  trade  between  the 
English  and  the  French. 

England's  undoubted  supremacy  on  the 
sea  forced  the  French  to  throw  open  their 
ports  to  the  Dutch,  against  whom  they  were 
usually  closed.  The  British  vice-admiralty 
courts  in  the  West  Indies  then  had  a  legal  or 
semi -legal  ground  on  which  to  justify  the 
seizure  of  Dutch  ships  as  carriers  of  contra- 
band of  war  under  the  provisions  of  the  "Rule 
of  1756."  The  strength  of  the  British  navy, 
backed  by  the  authority  of  the  courts,  was 
sufficient  to  break  up  to  a  great  extent  the 
part  which  the  Dutch  were  playing  in  the 
transportation  of  provisions  from  the  Ameri- 
can colonists  to  the  French. 

Another  go-between  was  found  in  the 
Spanish  settlement  of  Monte  Christi.  As  a 
market  or  as  a  source  of  supply,  this  port 
could  not  of  itself  have  been  attractive  to 


CAUSES  AND   CHARACTER  53 

American  shipping  interests,  but  the  cause  of 

Trade 
the  sudden  growth  of  its  commerce  lay  in  the  Through 

fact  that  it  was  contiguous  to  French  terri-  the  spanis 
tory.  To  make  the  conduct  of  business  more 
easy,  crown  subjects  from  North  America 
resided  at  the  port  and  small  French  vessels 
were  employed  to  transfer  the  provisions 
directly  to  French  soil,  so  that  the  trade 
could  almost  be  classed  as  a  direct  trade  with 
the  enemy.  Its  great  extent  is  attested  by 
the  observations  of  the  commanders  of  British 
war-vessels  sent  to  investigate.  At  the  time 
at  which  His  Majesty's  sloop,  Viper,  was  at 
Monte  Chris  ti  on  Feb.  5,  1759,  twenty -eight 
of  the  twenty-nine  ships  there  were  from  the 
North  American  colonies.  In  May,  1761,  a 
Captain  Hinxman  reported  that,  of  fifty  ves- 
sels in  port,  thirty -six  were  from  North  Amer- 
ica.1 Governor  Haldane  of  Jamaica  made 
affidavits  on  June  9,  1759  that  at  times  from 
one  hundred  to  one  hundred  and  twenty  North 
American  vessels  were  at  Monte  Chris  ti.2 
There  could  have  been  but  one  object  back  of 


1  G.  L.  Beer,  British  Colonial  Policy,  98,  note  2,  quoting  from  the 
Board  of  Trade  Papers  and  Home  Office  Papers. 

2  Ibid.,  99,  note  4. 


54       SMUGGLING  IN  THE  AMERICAN  COLONIES 

the  visits  of  all  these  vessels  to  this  port  at  this 
particular  time. 

British  The  objections  raised  by  the  British  civil 

to  Trade  ano^  military  authorities,  both  before  and  after 
with  French  tjje  Parliamentary  Act  of  1757,  were  natural 
and  reasonable.  The  supplying  of  the  enemy 
with  provisions  and  the  sinews  of  war,  unob- 
tainable elsewhere,  was  inherently  treason- 
able, and  by  the  Act  of  1757,  was  also  a  form 
of  smuggling.  Further,  the  exportation  *  of 
large  quantities  of  staples,  such  as  flour  and 
bread,  diminished  the  supply  in  America  when 
the  demand  was  abnormally  large  on  account 
of  the  quartering  of  a  great  army  of  British  and 
colonial  troops.  The  attending  rise  in  prices 
made  it  cheaper  for  the  military  commissary 
to  import  supplies  from  England,  yet  the 
elements  of  risk  and  delay  in  the  long  car- 
riage rendered  this  undesirable,  except  when 
the  necessity  was  urgent.  G.  L.  Beer  has 
ferreted  out  a  seemingly  inexhaustible  mass 
of  evidence  from  the  official  papers  and  corre- 
spondence in  the  English  Public  Record  Office, 
all  of  wrhich  seems  to  show  that  the  complaints 
of  the  officials  were  warranted  by  the  facts.1 

1  G.  L.  Beer,  British  Colonial  Policy,  chapter  vi  and  notes. 


CAUSES  AND   CHARACTER  55 

Their  alarm  was  great  enough  to  cause  the 
establishment  of  a  general  embargo,  whose 
life  however  was  short.1 

Pitt. on  Aug.  23, 1760,  summed  up  the  matter 
of  illegal  trade  with  the  enemy  in  his  instruc- 
tions to  Provincial  Governors  in  these  words: 
"The  Commanders  of  His  Majesty's  Forces 
and  Fleets,  in  North  America  and  the  West 
Indies,  having  transmitted  repeated  and  cer- 
tain Intelligence  of  an  illegal  and  most  perni- 
cious Trade,  carried  on  by  The  King's  Sub- 
jects in  North  America,  and  the  West  Indies, 
as  well  to  the  French  Islands,  as  to  the  French 
Settlements  on  the  Continent  of  America 
...  by  which  the  Enemy  is,  to  the  greatest 
Reproach  and  Detriment  of  Government, 
supplied  with  Provisions,  and  other  Neces- 
saries, whereby  They  are  principally,  if  not 
alone,  enabled  to  sustain  and  protract  this 
long  and  expensive  War;  ...  In  order  there- 
fore to  put  the  most  speedy  Stop  to  such  Prac- 
tices ...  so  highly  repugnant  to  the  Honor 
and  Wellbeing  of  this  Kingdom,  it  is  His 
Majesty's  express  Will  that  you  do  forthwith 
make  the  strictest  Enquiry  into  the  State  of 
this  dangerous  and  ignominious  Trade."2 

1  Beer,  Col.  Pol.,  113;  cf .  85.     2  Gray,  in Quincy's Mass.  Reports,  407. 


56       SMUGGLING  IN  THE  AMERICAN  COLONIES 

To  attempt  to  explain  the  motives  which 
prompted  the  colonies  to  engage  in  this 
treasonable  form  of  illicit  trade,  by  ascribing 
them  to  a  developing  spirit  of  independence, 

Political       would  call  up  a  series  of  counter  arguments 

Arguments 

Against        worth  considering.    In  the  first  place,  the  col- 

Contraband  Qnjstg   were   simultaneously   and   voluntarily 

\VllIl 


French  aiding  England  with  troops  and  money  in  her 
struggle  with  France  in  North  America,  al- 
though it  is  true  that  this  aid  was  rendered 
often  with  reluctance.  In  the  second  place,  the 
final  triumph  of  France  in  America,  toward 
which  this  contraband  trade  aided,  would  sim- 
ply mean  the  transferring  of  the  nominal 
authority  over  the  colonies  from  England,  to 
France,  whereas  we  have  seen  that  the  natural 
relations,  both  political  and  commercial,  of  the 
colonies  were  with  England.1  And,  finally,  it 
may  be  assumed  that  the  colonists  recognized 
that  if  the  English  succeeded  in  completely 
breaking  the  French  power  in  America,  there 
would  be  removed  the  need  which  the  colonies 

1  Jeremiah  Dummer,  agent  for  Massachusetts  in  London  from 
1710  to  1721,  "shows  how  early  and  passionate  among  the  English 
colonies  in  America  was  the  dread  of  the  American  power  of  France," 
declaring,"  that  those  colonies  can  never  be  easy  or  happy,  'whilst  the 
French  are  masters  of  Canada.'  "  G.  E.  Howard,  Preliminaries  of  the 
Revolution,  VIII,  6,  quoting  Tyler,  Am.  Lit.,  II,  119. 


CAUSES  AND  CHARACTER  57 

had  always  felt  for  British  protection.  In 
view  of  these  three  considerations,  it  appears 
that  every  possible  political  argument  would 
lead  to  the  offering  of  every  aid  by  the  colo- 
nists to  England.  It  must  be  the  assumption, 
then,  that  economic  reasons  urged  more 
strongly  the  continuance  of  the  trade  than 
political  considerations  opposed  it. 

The  motives  underlying  the  trade  with  the  Real 
French  narrow  down  to  one  of  two  or  to  a  ff°jlv?s. 

Underlying 

combination  of  two.  Undoubtedly,  the  per-  Contraband 
sonal  gain  accruing  to  those  engaged  in  the/ 
trade,  although  it  was  not  without  risk,  was- 
the  primary  motive  with  the  individual  trader; 
but  the  tolerance  and  approval  of  the  public 
needed  a  more  general  economic  basis  and  this 
is  to  be  found  in  the  same  reasons  already 
advanced,  making  the  trade  between  the  West 
Indies  and  North  America  essential  to  each. 
To  this  may  now  be  added  the  negative  but 
strengthening  circumstance  that  the  general 
acceptance  of  the  Molasses  Act  as  a  dead  letter 
had  destroyed  the  possibility  that  its  evasion 
would  cause  any  moral  feeling  of  guilt  or 
wrong-doing  in  the  minds  of  the  offenders  or 
of  the  public. 


58       SMUGGLING  IN  THE  AMERICAN  COLONIES 

The  unabashed  manner  in  which  the  colo- 
nists persisted  in  their  trade  with  the  enemy 
served  to  bring  the  entire  matter  of  illicit 
trade  to  the  attention  of  the  British  people 
and  government.  Non-enforcement  and  gen- 
eral smuggling  had  caused  the  West  Indies  trade 
to  take  on  features  of  a  tolerated  evil,  and  now 
it  was  the  particular  kind  of  smuggling  that 
aided  the  enemy,  which  caused  the  British 
government  to  make  almost  the  first  serious 
effort  to  break  up  all  kinds  of  illicit  trade. 
A  customs  service  which  never  had  attempted 
to  enforce  the  Molasses  Act  could  not  be 
whipped  into  an  efficient  working  force  when 
the  crisis  demanded  it.  The  military  arm, 
which  was  the  first  to  feel  vitally  the  crippling 
effect  of  the  illegal  trade  with  the  enemy, 
Recognition  was  the  first  to  call  to  the  assistance  of  the 
ance  of°Aid  revenue  officers  the  powerful  British  navy. 
of  Royal  its  co-operation  seemed  to  strengthen  the 

Navy  to  ~, 

Customs      purpose  of  the  regular  custom-house  omcers, 


Service  w^  the  net  resuit  that  the  effort  to  col- 
lect the  duties  prescribed  by  the  Molasses 
Act,  with  a  view  to  a  breaking  up  of  the 
trade  with  the  French,  caused  the  revenue 
from  molasses  to  increase  from  the  aver- 


CAUSES  AND   CHARACTER  59 

age  previous  to  1755  of  £259  to  £1189  in 
1761. l 

This  attempt  at  enforcement  of  the  pro- 
visions of  the  Molasses  Act  caused  the  seiz- 
ure of  many  vessels  trading  illegally  and 
this,  in  turn,  led  to  a  conflict  of  authority 
between  the  vice-admiralty  courts  and  the  Admiralty 

rrn  f  Courts 

courts  oi  common  law.     Ine  tormer  strove,     vs. 

generally  speaking,  to  uphold  the  actions  of  Common 

Law  Courts 

the  customs  officers,  and  with  them  rested 
the  legal  right.  The  common  law  courts 
were  influenced  strongly  by  local  prejudice 2 

1  G.  L.  Beer,  British  Colonial  Policy,  115. 

2  Cf .  Thomas  Pownall  on  this  point:  "Under  the  third  article,  I 
fear  experience  can  well  say,  how  powerfully,  even  in  courts,  the 
influence  of  the  leaders  of  party  have  been  felt  in  matters  between 
individuals.     But  in  these  popular  governments,  and  where  every 
executive  officer  is  under  a  dependence  for  a  temporary,  wretched, 
and  I  had  almost  said,  arbitrary  support  to  the  deputies  of  the 
people, — it  will  be  no  injustice  to  the  frame  of  human  nature,  either 
in  the  person  of  the  judges,  of  the  juries,  or  even  the  popular  lawyer 
to  suggest,  how  little  the  crown,  or  the  rights  of  government,  when 
opposed  to  the  spirit  of  democracy,  or  even  to  the  passions  of  the 
populace,  has  to  expect  of  that  support,  maintainence,  and  guardian- 
ship, which  the  courts  are  even  by  the  constitution  supposed  to  hold 
for  the  crown.    Nor  would  it  be  any  injustice  to  any  of  the  colonies 
just  to  remark  in  this  place,  how  difficult,  if  ever  practicable  it  is, 
in  any  of  their  courts  of  common  law  to  convict  any  person  of  a 
violation  of  the  laws  of  trade,  or  in  any  matter  of  crown  revenue. 
Some  of  our  acts  of  parliament  direct  the  prosecution  and  punish- 
ment of  the  breach  of  the  laws  of  trade,  to  take  its  course  in  the 
courts  of  Vice-admiralty:  And  it  has  been  thought  by  a  very  great 
practitioner  .    .    .   that  there  should  be  an  advocate  appointed  to 


60       SMUGGLING  IN  THE  AMERICAN  COLONIES    . 

and  feeling  and  the  desire  to  please  those 
from  whom  the  judges'  salaries  were  received, 
— the  people.  A  jury  that  would  convict  was 
difficult  to  find.  Thus  we  read  of  the  Col- 
lector at  New  York  arguing  even  in  1739  that 
the  case  arising  from  the  seizure  of  gun- 
powder and  molasses,  imported  illegally  from 
St.  Eustatia,  should  be  tried  before  the  Ad- 
miralty Court  instead  of  before  the  common 
law  court,  and  apprehending  the  unlikelihood 
of  securing  a  favorable  verdict  from  "a  Jury 
who  perhaps  are  equally  concerned  in  carry- 
ing on  an  illicit  trade,  and  its  hardly  to  be  ex- 
pected that  they  will  find  each  other  guilty."1 
This  speaks  eloquently  of  the  general  preva- 
lence of  illicit  trading  and  the  temper  of  the 
public  mind  concerning  it.  The  admiralty 
courts  themselves  were  not  above  suspicion 
as  is  witnessed  by  the  complaints  sent  to 

each  court  from  Great  Britain,  who,  having  a  salary  independent  of 
the  people,  should  be  directed  and  empowered  to  prosecute  in  that 
court,  not  only  every  one  who  was  an  offender,  but  also  every  officer 
of  the  customs,  who  through  neglect,  collusion,  oppression,  or  any 
other  breach  of  his  trust  became  such."  Thomas  Pownall,  The 
Administration  of  the  Colonies,  4th  ed.,  pp.  108  ff. 

1  A.  B.  Hart,  American  History  Told  by  Contemporaries,  Vol.  II, 
No.  87,  quoting  "  Documents  relative  to  the  Colonial  History  of  the 
State  of  New  York,"  VI,  154-155.  It  was  the  illegal  importation  of 
gunpowder,  contrary  to  the  Act  of  1663,  and  the  enforcement  of  that 
act,  which  seem  to  have  interested  the  Collector  most  in  this  case. 


CAUSES  AND  CHARACTER  61 

General  Amherst  concerning  the  courts  in 
South  Carolina,  New  York,  and  Pennsylvania.1 
So  established,  in  fact,  in  public  sentiment 
was  the  trade  with  the  foreign  West  Indies, 
that  as  the  war  drew  toward  its  close,  prom- 
ising the  return  to  normal  conditions,  the  at- 
tempts to  collect  the  duties  imposed  by  the 
Molasses  Act  appear  even  to  have  been  re- 
laxed.2 

1  Cf.  G.  L.  Beer,  British  Colonial  Policy,  126,  notes  1,  2,  3,  4. 

2  G.  L.  Beer,  British  Colonial  Policy,  230,  and  n.  8;  cf.  116. 


CHAPTER  IV 

POLITICAL  SITUATION  IN  ENGLAND   AND  AMERICA 

General       THE  situation  which  existed  in  the  customs 
Situation      service  and  the  admiralty  courts,  which  the 

as  Revealed  prevalence  of  smuggling  during  the  French 
by  Contra- 
band Trade  War  caused  to  be  exposed,  was  hardly  one  to 

with  French  bring  Delight  to  the  heart  of  the  British  gov- 
ernment. The  statement  of  Howard,  a  Rhode 
Island  lawyer  with  Tory  leanings,  presents 
what  may  be  considered  as  the  British  view. 
He  said,  "It  is  notorious,  that  smuggling  *  had 
well  nigh  become  established  in  some  of  the 
colonies.  Acts  of  parliament  had  been  uni- 
formly dispensed  with  by  those  whose  duty 
it  was  to  execute  them;  corruption  *  had  almost 
grown  into  a  system;  courts  of  admiralty  * 
became  subject  to  mercantile  influence;  and 
the  king's  revenue  sacrificed  to  the  venality 
and  perfidiousness  of  courts  and  officers."1 

k 

1  A  Letter  from  a  Gentleman  at  Halifax,  to  his  Friend  in  Rhode- 
Island,  containing  Remarks  upon  a  Pamphlet,  entitled,  "The  Rights 
of  Colonies  Examined."  (Newport,  1765).  Reprinted  in  Hart. 
American  History  Told  by  Contemporaries,  II,  sec.  139. 


POLITICAL  SITUATION  63 

It  was  this  state  of  things  that  the  ad- 
ministrative measures  of  Grenville,  described 
in  the  chapter  following,  were  designed  to 
reform.  At  the  same  time  at  which  the  discour- 
aging facts  in  connection  with  the  status  and 
evasions  of  the  Acts  of  Trade  and  Navigation, 
and  especially  of  the  Molasses  Act,  were 
brought  into  the  limelight  in  England  by  the 
illegal  trade  with  the  French,  the  British  Ex-  British 

chequer  was  confronted  with  a  serious  short-  J?eed  of 

Revenue 

age  in  funds.  Although  the  colonies  had  for 
the  most  part  paid  a  proportionate  amount  of 
the  enormous  sum  expended  in  their  defense,1 
the  maintenance  of  the  vast  domain,  acquired 
at  the  cessation  of  hostilities,  involved  the 
annual  expenditure  of  many  more  millions  for 
which  experience  had  taught  the  voluntary  aid 

1  Lord  Sheffield  gives  the  following  items  of  expenditure  by  Great 
Britain  on  account  of  the  American  colonies, 

By  the  war  of  1739 £31,000,000 

By  the  war  of  1755 71,500,000 


Total  £102,500,000 

Doubling  this  amount  by  the  £100,000,000  expended  in  the  war  of 
the  Revolution,  he  adds,  "  And  thus  have  we  expended  a  larger  sum  in 
defending  and  retaining  our  Colonies,  than  the  value  of  all  the  mer- 
chandise which  we  have  ever  sent  them;  we  have,  in  a  great  measure, 
disbursed  this  enormous  sum,  to  secure  the  possession  of  a  country 
which  yielded  us  no  revenue,  and  whose  commerce  called  for  but 
£1,655,092  of  the  manufactures  of  Britain."  Appendix,  page  301. 


64       SMUGGLING  IN  THE  AMERICAN  COLONIES 

of  the  colonies  could  not  be  depended  upon. 
Revenue  from  some  source  was  a  necessity. 

The  Grenville  Act  of  1764  sought  to  raise 
this  revenue  largely  from  that  part  of  the  trade 
of  the  colonies  which  it  was  apparent  was 
the  most  flourishing  and  which  had  been 

"  Sugar  yielding  practically  no  returns  in  duties.  The 
"Sugar  Act"  amended  the  Molasses  Act,  im- 
posing a  new  duty  on  refined  sugar  and  lower- 
ing the  duty  on  molasses  and  syrups.1  As 
if  to  offset  possible  and  expected  resistance 

Revenue  from  the  colonists,  the  use  to  which  this  reve- 
nue could  be  put  was  specifically  provided. 
It  was  not  to  be  used  for  the  general  expenses 
of  the  British  Exchequer  but  only  for  the 
expenses  in  part  of  maintaining  the  military 
establishment  in  the  colonies,  while  three  years 
later  the  Townshend  duties  were  to  be  devoted 
to  those  of  administering  justice  and  for  the 
support  of  civil  government  in  the  colonies, 


1  The  duties  imposed  by  the  "Sugar  Act"  were,  "For  every  hundred 
weight  avoirdupois  of  such  foreign  white  or  clayed  sugars,  one  pound, 
two  shillings,  over  and  above  all  other  duties  imposed  by  any  former 
act  of  parliament."  Upon  molasses  the  act  declared,  "That  in  lieu 
and  instead  of  the  rate  and  duty  imposed  by  the  said  act  upon  melasses 
and  syrups,  there  shall,  from  and  after  .  .  .  (Sept.  29,  1764)  be  raised, 
levied,  collected,  and  paid  unto  His  Majesty,  for  and  upon  every  gallon 
of  melasses  or  syrups,  .  .  .  the  sum  of  three  pence." 


POLITICAL  SITUATION  65 

and  any  surplus  could  be  legally  used  only 

for  the  support  and  protection  of  the  colonies.1 

To  aggravate  the  situation,  England  was 

in  an  unsettled  political  condition  over  the  Unsettled 

.  .  Political 

same  questions.     The  British  farmer  objected  situation  in 

to  bearing  the  expenses  of  a  war  waged  in  Ensland 
behalf  of  the  untaxed  colonists,  who,  by 
smuggling,  had  always  eluded  most  of  the 
possible  duties.  Add  to  the  fact  that  the 
colonists  were  heavily  in  debt  to  the  British 
merchants,  the  grievance  that  "The  fact 
was  notorious  that  by  the  evasion  of  the  navi- 
gation laws  and  acts  of  trade,  the  colonists 
had  escaped  the  restrictions  intended  by  those 
laws,  and  at  the  same  time  had  received 
bounties  and  drawbacks  from  the  British 
Exchequer  which  enabled  them  to  under- 
sell the  British  merchants  in  the  markets 
of  Europe,"  2  and  it  is  easy  to  appreciate  the 
feelings  of  the  one  party  in  England.  Fur- 

*The  Sugar  Act  reads, "  That  all  the  Monies  which  shall  arise  by  the 
several  Rates  and  Duties  herein  before  granted  .  .  .  shall  be  en- 
tered separate  and  apart  from  all  other  Monies  paid  or  payable  to 
His  Majesty  .  .  . ;  and  shall  be  there  reserved,  to  be,  from  time 
to  time,  disposed  of  by  Parliament,  towards  defraying  the  necessary 
Expenses  of  defending,  protecting,  and  securing,  the  British  Colonies 
and  Plantations  in  America." 

2  Mellen  Chamberlain  in  J.  Winsor,  Narrative  and  Critical  History 
of  America,  VI,  18. 


66       SMUGGLING  IN  THE  AMERICAN  COLONIES 

thermore,  as  we  have  seen,  the  continuance  of 
the  late  war  on  the  part  of  France  was  made 
possible  largely  because  of  the  goods  and  sup- 
plies delivered  by  the  smuggling  expeditions 
of  the  colonists. 

The   colonists   and    their   sympathisers    in 
England  maintained  that  they  were  paying 
more  than  their  share  of  the  military  and  main- 
Colonists'     tenance   expenses,    on    account   of   the    vast 
to  Revenue  amount  °f  trade  which  they  were  obliged  to 
Measures     throw  to  England,  but  expressed  a  willingness 
to  aid  further,  provided  such  aid  was  volun- 
tary.    In  England,  the  frequently  changing 
cabinets   were  filled   with  men   of  divergent 
views.     Pitt    recognized    the    futility    of    an 
attempt  by  Parliament  to  place  a  fixed  tax 
from  without  upon  a  people  trained  to  believe 
such  a  procedure  opposed  to  all  natural  laws. 

Another  great  question  loomed  up  before 
the  two  parties  on  either  side  of  the  sea, — 
that  of  the  "prerogative."  The  Liberals  were 
attempting  to  transfer  the  power  of  the  pre- 
rogative from  the  Crown  to  Parliament.  Now 
the  Albany  Congress  in  1754  had  admitted 
the  fact  that  all  property  in  unoccupied  lands 
belonged  to  the  King,  not  to  the  people  or  a 


POLITICAL  SITUATION  67 

party,  and  that  therefore  the  political  rela- 
tions were  with  the  Crown, — "Not  citizens 
within  the  Realm,  but  subjects  only  of  the 
Crown."  Franklin  reasoned,  "Sovereignty  of 
the  Crown  I  understand.  The  sovereignty  ro  ^ive* 
of  the  British  legislature  out  of  Britain  I  do 
not  understand,"1  and  later,  "America  is  not 
part  of  the  dominions  of  England  but  of  the 
King's  dominion."2  From  the  liberality  of  the 
charters,  granted  always  by  the  King,  and 
from  the  privileges  usurped  without  contest 
and  enjoyed  for  such  a  long  time  that  they 
seemed  almost  as  granted  rights,  the  colonists 
had  built  up  a  bulwark  of  rights  and  assumed 
rights,  the  modification  of  which  by  Parlia- 
ment invited  vehement  opposition.  It  is  not 
to  be  supposed,  however,  that  the  colonists 
were  any  fonder  of  the  "prerogative"  as  such 
than  were  the  Liberals  in  England:  they  sim- 
ply appealed  to  it  to  escape  Parliament; 
against  its  exercise  they  objected  as  strongly 
as  did  the  anti-prerogative  party  in  England. 
The  systems  of  government  among  the 
American  colonies  and  the  character  of  the 

1  Works,  IV,  208.     2;  Ibid,  IV,  284.     Marginal  notes  of  Franklin's 
on  English  pamphlets. 


68       SMUGGLING  IN  THE  AMERICAN  COLONIES 

people  are  elements  which  must  be  considered 
before  we  begin  to  inquire  into  the  methods 
adopted  to  enforce  the  Sugar  Act  and  the 
reception  it  received. 

In  considering  either  the  material  or  polit- 
ical development  of  the  mainland  colonies 
of  North  America,  it  soon  becomes  manifest 
that  it  was  the  possible  economic  or  financial 
returns  which  guided  the  course  of  the  home 
country  relative  to  establishing  forms  of  gov- 
ernment. Until  the  middle  of  the  seventeenth 
Looseness  century,  the  policy,  if  it  may  be  called  such,  of 

in  Colonial       ,        ^  £  .  , 

Govern-  the  Crown  was  to  give  a  free  rein  to  those 
ments  trading  companies  and  individuals,  which  it 
had  deputized  for  colonizing  purposes.  The 
settlements  were  divided  into  many  provinces 
and  lacked  any  semblance  of  unification.  Save 
Virginia  in  1624,  it  was  not  until  1680  that  any 
of  the  colonies  was  organized  under  a  definite 
royal  government.  When  the  governments  took 
their  final  shape  there  was  exhibited  a  wide 
variety  in  the  forms;  the  semi-independent  in 
New  England,  the  closely  checked  proprietary 
in  Maryland,  the  liberal  proprietary  in  Penn- 
sylvania, and  the  royal  in  most  of  the  colonies.1 

1  See  C.  McL.  Andrews,  Colonial  Self-Government. 


POLITICAL  SITUATION  69 

These  different  forms  of  government  had,  Points  of 

Similarity 

however,  two    elements    in    common,     r  irst,  in  Forms  of 

representation  in  some  form  was  accorded  to  Govem- 

ment 

the  people.  Second,  the  influence  of  Parlia- 
ment was  completely  overshadowed  by  that 
of  the  King.  All  charters  were  liberal.  The 
possession  of  these  privileges  for  several 
generations  fixed  in  the  minds  of  the  colonists 
the  idea  that  the  privileges  were  natural 
rights  and  it  was  the  attempts  of  succeeding 
ministries  to  make  this  representation  of 
minimum  value,  coupled  with  the  effort  of 
one  party  to  maintain  the  power  of  the  King's 
prerogative  and,  of  the  other  party,  to  in- 
crease the  power  of  Parliament,  that  stirred 
up  the  spirit  of  unrest  and  defiance  of  the 
next  ten  years. 

In  dealing  with  the  North  American  colo- 
nies, moreover,  England  was  facing  a  problem 
differing  radically  in  many  respects  from  any 
of  its  other  colonial  problems;  and  it  was  a 
problem  which  had  no  precedents  for  guid- 
ance. Previously,  no  colonies  had  attained  Unique 

.  Character 

either  the  extent  or  tae  importance  of  those  Ofthe 


in  North  America.     Their  natural  resources 

Colonies 

made  them  of  great  advantage  to  the  mother 


70       SMUGGLING  IN  THE  AMERICAN  COLONIES 

country  and  the  colonists  were  quick  to 
grasp  this  fact.  The  colonists  themselves 
were,  as  a  rule,  above  the  average  of  settlers. 
The  motives  which  caused  them  to  leave 
the  mother  land  were  higher  than  the  average. 
The  adventurers  were  outnumbered  by  the 
seekers  after  religious  and  political  liberty. 
England  was  dealing  with  a  class  of  colonists 
more  nearly  on  a  plane  with  her  own  citizens. 
In  the  last  third  of  the  seventeenth  century, 
Sir  Josiah  Child  was  able  to  write,  "I  am  now 
to  write  of  a  People  whose  Frugality,  Industry, 
and  Temperance,  and  the  happiness  of  whose 
Laws  and  Institutions,  do  promise  to  them- 
selves long  Life  with  a  wonderful  encrease  of 
People,  Riches,  and  Power." 

G.  L.  Beer  points  out  that  "The  movement 

toward   independence   dates   from    the   very 

foundation   of   the   colonies"1    and   gives    as 

Reasons     reasons  that  the  New  England  settlements 

were  not  a  result  of  natural  expansion  but 

Develop-    were  more  of  the  nature  of  a  schism  or  seces- 

spint  of     sion.  The  original  characteristics  of  extreme  in- 

indepen-    dividualism  m  the  immigrants  were  strength- 
dence 

ened  by  the  isolation  of  the  colonies.     It  was 

»G.  L.  Beer,  British  Colonial  Policy,  161. 


POLITICAL  SITUATION  71 

the  policy  of  England  to  have  the  colonies 
bear  their  own  administrative  expenses, 
through  appropriations  from  the  colonial 
legislatures.  Governors  and  judges  were  thus 
dependent  on  the  people  for  their  salaries  and 
the  colonists  were  early  to  learn  that  by  the 
withholding  of  salaries  they  could  exert  a  great 
influence  over  the  actions  of  the  officials. 
This  not  only  made  evasion  of  law  easy  but 
served  to  awaken  the  people  to  a  fuller  con- 
sciousness of  the  possibilities  of  gaining  inde- 
pendence. 

If  it  is  true — and  the  facts  seem  to  justify 
Beer's  conclusions — that  a  spirit  of  indepen- 
dence was  ever  the  underlying  motive  for  all 
unrest  in  the  colonies,  it  may  be  assumed  that 
the  colonists  did  not  have  any  clear  concep- 
tion of  it,  and  had  they  had,  a  sense  of  policy 
would  have  led  them  to  keep  expression  of 
this  spirit  in  the  background.  More  was  to  be 
gained  in  every  way  by  expressions  of  loyalty 
to  England  than  by  manifestations  of  a  desire 
for  independence.  However  great  may  have 
been  the  influences,  some  of  which  we  have 
noted,  that  would  tend  to  keep  alive  the  spirit  dence  KePt 

in  the 

of  independence,  there  was  always  the  oppos-  Background 


72       SMUGGLING  IN  THE  AMERICAN  COLONIES 

ing  fact  of  weight  that  powerful  enemies  of  the 
colonies,  as  well  as  of  England,  were  present 
in  America.  As  long  as  Spain  and  France 
exercised  any  powj^uGnfluejrcein  America, 
so  long  was  it  essential  that  the  English  colo^ 
nies  should  remain  under  the  nominal  protec- 
tion of  EngtendpTor  they  were  not  strong 
enough  to  defend  themselves_aniLth£ir.  sbip- 
ping.  The  danger  from  the  Spanish  was  the 
first  to  be  eliminated  and  the  French  were 
finally  disposed  of  in  1763.1  Remaining  in 
America  as  the  only  possible  foes  of  the 
colonies  were  the  Indians,  and  the  danger 
from  them  was  such  as  the  settlers  could  over- 
come by  their  advantage  in  organized  num- 
bers and  a  superior  civilization. 

The  first  genuine  politicjdjsentiment  com- 
mon to  all  the  coloniesappeared  simultane- 
ously with  the  passage  of  the  Sugar  Act  in 
1764,  and  the  preparations  to  enforce  it.  The 
Molasses  Act;— practicatty  vitiated  by  thirty 
years'  constant,  nearly  reputable,  almost 
legalized  smuggling,  was  the  occasion  of 
nothing  more  than  sporadic  outbursts  of  in- 

1  For  a  full  treatment  of  the  results,  political  and  social,  of  the 
French  and  Indian  War,  cf.  G.  E.  Howard,  "Prelim,  of  the  Revo- 
lution," chap.  i. 


POLITICAL  SITUATION  73 

dignation,  arising  for  the  most  part  from  those 
who  were  occasionally  affected  financially. 
The  change  to  the  Sugar  Act  which,  if  enforced, 
would  be  felt,  directly  or  indirectly,  by  every 
citizen  of  every  community,  awakened  a  genu- 
ine protest  based,  it  would  seem,  less  on  the 
burden  of  this  tax  itselFthan  on  the  principle 
of  taxation  involved. 

It  is  a  mistake  to  assume  that  customs  taxa- 
tion in  itself  was  an  innovation  to  the  colonists, 
as  one  might  well  imagine  from  the  clamor 
which  the  acts  of  1763  and  1764  aroused.     Be-  Earlier 
sides   the  Parliamentary  plantation  duty  of 


1673,  and  one  or  two  others,  the  assemblies  by  the 

c  •  •  Colonists 

oi  the  various  colonies  had  rrom  the  start  lev- 

ied taxes  and  duties.  No  general  or  unified 
system  could  exist,  but  in  practically  all  the 
colonies  export  and  import  duties  and  tonnage 
duties  were  levied.  The  tariff  measures  were 
usually  adjusted  to  changing  needs.  A  very 
thorough  study  of  the  commercial  legislation 
of  the  colonies  by  A.  A.  Giesecke  1  reveals  a 
mass  of  such  measures  the  extent  of  which 
would  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  the  colonists 
would  have  been  accustomed  to  the  payment 

1  A.  A.  Giesecke,  American  Commercial  Legislation  before  1789. 


74       SMUGGLING  IN  THE  AMERICAN  COLONIES 

of  all  kinds  of  duties  and  taxes.  Substan- 
tially all  these  measures  were  measures  of 
self -taxation.  The  later  effort  of  Parliament 
to  enforce  general  revenue  duties  intro- 
duced new  elements  capable  of  arousing  op- 
position. 

Previous  to  1763,  the  political  clouds  were 
such  as  might  arise  in  the  skies  of  any  nation 
with  colonies  at  a  great  distance  and  with 
inadequate  means  of  communication.  Un- 
popular governors  met  with  disfavor,  the 
signs  of  which  no  pains  were  taken  to  conceal. 
Colonial  legislatures  had  their  differences  with 
their  overlords.  There  existed  then,  as  now, 
the  hot-headed,  excitable,  and  incendiary  ele- 
ment in  society,  whose  clamor  was  probably 
louder  than  their  influence  merited.  The  ma- 
jority of  the  people  would  have  been  classified 
as  Tories,  for,  as  late  as  1776,  the  number  of 
Tories  was  estimated  at  about  two-fifths  of  the 
entire  population.  What  discontent  existed 
previous  to  1763  was  local  rather  than  general 
in  character.  No  unity  of  purpose  was  evi- 
dent among  the  different  colonies  and,  in  fact, 
they  were  not  unified  in  any  particular  either 
of  government  or  of  sentiment.  Even  the 


POLITICAL  SITUATION  75 

Acts  of  Trade  could  provoke  no  unanimous 
protest,  for  provisions  which  offended  one 
section  were  considered  as  beneficial  by  an- 
other, and  restrictive  measures  in  which  were 
latent  the  means  of  arousing  the  most  general 
disapprobation,  remained  unenforced  and  in- 
effective. 

About  1756,  "writs  of  assistance"  began 
to  be  used  in  Massachusetts,  and  later  in  New 
Hampshire,  by  the  customs  officers  to  aid 
in  their  work  against  the  smugglers.  The  "Writs of 
writs  were  issued  by  the  Superior  Court  and 
directed  any  officer  or  subject  of  the  King  to 
aid  in  the  forcible  search  for  contraband  goods 
in  any  vessel,  store-house,  or  private  building. 
They  were  transferable  general  warrants  ex- 
tending during  the  reign  of  the  sovereign,  and 
returns  were  to  be  made  to  no  officer  or  court. 
In  England,  this  form  of  writ  had  been  used 
since  the  reign  of  Charles  II  under  act  of 
Parliament,  and  it  was  issued  by  the  Excheq- 
uer Court.  By  the  Act  of  the  7th  and  8th  of 
William  III  its  availability  seemed  to  be  ex- 
tended to  the  colonies  without  the  naming  of 
any  court  of  issue.  The  Massachusetts  As- 
sembly had  given  the  same  judicial  authority 


76       SMUGGLING  IN  THE  AMERICAN  COLONIES 

to  their  Superior  Court  as  that  possessed  by 
the  Exchequer  Court,  and  the  Court  over- 
came, if  it  had  them,  its  scruples  against 


Arguments    orranting  writs, 
for  Writs 


Upon  the  death  of  George  II  in  1760,  all 
writs  would  expire  within  six  months,  and  or- 
ganized opposition  was  formed  against  the 
petitions  to  the  Court  praying  for  new  writs. 
Mr.  Gridley  had  charge  of  the  case  for  the 
collectors  and  the  government.  A  large  part 
of  his  argument  was  consumed  in  attempting 
to  prove  the  legality  of  the  writs,  to  Hutch- 
inson  who  was  presiding  at  the  hearing  of  the 
petition.  Mr.  Justice  Gray,  commenting  on 
the  legal  aspects  of  the  case,  says,  "A  careful 
examination  of  the  subject  compels  the  con- 
clusion that  the  decision  of  Hutchinson  and 
his  associates  has  been  too  strongly  condemned 
as  illegal."  l  The  legal  questions,  however, 
concern  us  less,  but  sufficient  consideration 
must  be  given  them  to  make  plain  the  fact 
that  the  granting  of  the  writs  had  a  legal 
basis.  Of  more  relevance  was  Gridley 's  con- 
clusion, "It  is  true  the  common  privileges  of 
Englishmen  are  taken  away  in  this  Case,  but 

1  Quincy's  Reporit,  540. 


POLITICAL  SITUATION  77 

even  their  privileges  are  not  so  in  cases  of 
Crime  and  fine.  'Tis  the  necessity  of  the 
Case  and  the  benefit  of  the  Revenue  that  jus- 
tifies this  Writ.  *  *  *  The  necessity  of  having 
public  taxes  effectually  *  *  collected  is  of 
infinitely  greater  moment  to  the  whole,  than 
the  Liberty  of  any  Individual."1 

John  Adams,  in  old  age,  wrote  that  Otis, 
for  the  people,  began  his  famous  argument  Alleged 
with  "A  dissertation  on  the  rights  of  man  in  a  Against*1 
state  of  nature."  "From  individual  inde-  Writs 
pendence  he  proceeded  to  association." 
"These  principles  and  these  rights  were 
wrought  into  the  English  constitution,  as 
fundamental  laws."  He  "demonstrated  that 
if  the  acts  of  trade  were  considered  as  reve- 
nue laws,  they  destroyed  all  our  security  of 
property,  liberty,  and  life,  every  right  of 
nature,  and  the  English  constitution  and  the 
charter  of  the  province."  "  The  Americans  *  * 
had  connived  at  the  distinction  between  ex- 
ternal and  internal  taxes,  and  had  submitted 
to  the  acts  of  trade  as  regulations  of  commerce, 
but  never  as  taxation,  or  revenue  laws."  He 
showed  that  the  acts  of  trade  were  "unjust, 

1  Quincy's  Reports,  481. 


78       SMUGGLING  IN  THE  AMERICAN  COLONIES 

oppressive,  and  impracticable;  that  they  never 
had  been  and  never  could  be  executed;  that  'if 
the  King  of  Great  Britain  in  person  were 
encamped  on  Boston  Common,  at  the  head  of 
twenty  thousand  men,  with  all  his  navy  on 
our  coast,  he  would  not  be  able  to  execute 
these  laws.  They  would  be  resisted  or  eluded. ' ' 
In  connection  with  the  Molasses  Act,  "He 
asserted  this  act  to  be  a  revenue  law,  a 
taxation  law,  made  by  a  foreign  legislature, 
without  our  consent,  and  by  a  legislature  who 
had  no  feeling  for  us,  and  whose  interest 
prompted  them  to  tax  us  to  the  quick." 1  The 
general  trend  of  Otis's  speech  is  then  summed 
up  in  Tudor 's  words,  "He  reproached  the  na- 
tion, parliament,  and  king  with  injustice,  il- 
liberality,  ingratitude,  and  oppression  in  their 
conduct  towards  this  country."2  A.  B.  Hart 
is  of  opinion  that  Otis's  actual  speech  "  marks 
the  tone  of  public  opinion  in  Massachusetts  in 
1761,"  and  that  it  may  be  regarded  "as  the  first 
in  the  chain  of  events  which  led  directly  and 
irresistibly  to  revolution  and  independence." 3 

lf  2  This  and  preceding  quotations  are  from  Tudor's  Life  of 
James  Otis,  Chap.  VI.  But  see  criticism  by  C.  F.  Adams  in  Adams' 
Works,  X,  362,  n.;  Gray  in  Quincy's  Reports,  p.  469,  n.;  and  Ashley  in 
Surveys,  pp.  356  ff. 

J  A.  B.  Hart,  American  History  Leaflets,  No.  33,  Introduction. 


CHAPTER  V 

ENFORCEMENT   OF    LAW   AND    ITS   RESULTS 

THE  year  1763  marks  the  converging  of  the 
political   and   economic   forces   operative   in 
America.     We  have  endeavored  to  show  that 
the  English  commercial  system  divides  itself 
into  two  parts.     The  main  structure,  consist- 
ing of  the  enactments  concerning  the  means  of 
shipping,   and   the   trade   between   America,  Main  Body 
England,  and  the  other  countries  of  the  world,  £awg*  * 
excepting  the  West  Indies,  was  considered  by  incapable 

i-  j  ..         •       T-<      i       j  of  Arousing 

the   ruling   powers   and   parties   in   England  universal 

economically  advantageous  to  England.     It  Political 

Feeling 
happened  to  be  in  active   force   during  the 

critical  period  in  American  history:  its  incep- 
tion antedated  the  formation  of  some  of  the 
colonies  and  its  continuance  did  not  cease 
with  England's  loss  of  her  American  posses- 
sions.1 The  natural  products  of  England 
were  less  diversified  than  those  of  America; 
those  of  America  were  many  and  various.  A 

1  See  S.  G.  Fisher,  The  Struggle  for  American  Independence,  p.  68. 


80       SMUGGLING  IN  THE  AMERICAN  COLONIES 

system  which  met  with  general  favor  in  Eng- 
land because  of  its  apparent  aid  to  home  in- 
dustry could  not  be  expected  to  arouse  a  simi- 
larly unanimous  negative  sentiment  among  the 
different  colonial  sections  whose  varied  indus- 
tries were  variously  affected,  and  it  did  not. 
Those  acts  of  trade  which  were  constructed 
with  a  certain  degree  of  reciprocal  feeling 
towards  the  colonies  could  be  appreciated  in 
some  sections  and  meant  nothing  in  others. 
The  restrictions  on  the  rights  of  the  colonists 
to  buy  except  in  the  British  markets  were 
not  seriously  felt  as  a  grievance,  because  the 
effect  of  this  portion  of  the  laws  was  largely 
to  legislate  commerce  into  those  channels  into 
which  economic  necessity  would  have  natur- 
ally forced  it.  We  may  eliminate,  therefore, 
this  main  portion  of  the  Acts  of  Trade  and 
Navigation  as  a  matrix  for  the  development  of 
any  very  strong  or  general  spirit  of  indepen- 
dence, common  to  all  the  colonies. 

Universal         The    remaining   part,    the    Molasses    Act, 

Molasses     based  essentially  on  special  favoritism  to  one 

Act  party  in  interest,  with  all  traces  of  mutual 

benefits    omitted,    would,    if   enforced,    place 

all  the  colonies  to  a  greater  or  less  extent  in  a 


ENFORCEMENT  OF  LAW  AND  ITS  RESULTS      81 

state  of  protest  against  the  same  inevitable 
result, — the  ruin  of  a  trade  economically  essen- 
tial in  some  measure  to  each. 

For  thirty  years  the  Molasses  Act  had 
remained  practically  unenforced.  The  time 
chosen  to  enforce  it  was  the  same  at  which 

the  restraint  on  the  desire  for  independence,  Forces 

Converging 

caused  by  the  presence  of  France  in  America,  in  1763 
was  removed.  It  was  the  same  time  at  which 
the  attempt  of  Parliament  to  contest  the  pre- 
rogative, a  purely  political  move  in  which,  to 
preserve  their  charter  privileges,  the  Ameri- 
cans had  some  interest  on  the  side  of  the  King, 
was  especially  urged  in  England.  The  occas- 
sion  which  called  the  old  Molasses  Act  and 
subsequent  Sugar  Act  into  an  active  life  was 
the  need  of  revenue,  so  that  at  this  otherwise 
very  inopportune  time  there  was  involved  an- 
other principle  most  obnoxious  in  every  re- 
spect to  every  colonist  at  all  times, — taxation. 
This  last  feature  served  as  a  flux  to  fuse  to- 
gether all  those  influences  which  had  always 
tended  towards  each  other^in  the  composition 
of  a  revolutionary  spirit. 

That  v/hich  followed  the  decision  to  raise  a 
revenue  by  means  of  the  Sugar  Act  is  inti- 


82       SMUGGLING  IN  THE  AMERICAN  COLONIES 

mately  connected  with  the  features  of  the 
Reforms  evasions  of  the  Molasses  Act  previous  to  1763. 
by  invasions  ^acn  °f  tne  new  regulations  passed  to  facili- 
of  Molasses  tate  the  execution  of  these  revenue  acts  is 

Art 

directly  traceable  to  the  fact  that  the  great 
extent  of  the  smuggling,  expecially  during  the 
French  War,  showed  only  too  clearly  to  the 
British  government  just  where  weaknesses 
lay  and  how  they  could  best  be  remedied,  and 
the  possibilities  in  revenue  in  which  a  strict 
enforcement  would  result. 

Immediately  following  the  decision  to  en- 
force the  Trade  Acts  and  to  use  the  duties  as 
Officers       revenue  mediums,  Grenville  and  his  cabinet 

of  the  Navy  . 

Empowered  became  very  active  in  having  passed  the  nec- 
to  Act  as  essary  measures.  It  is  of  importance  to  note 
Officials  that  instructions  to  the  governors  were  sent 
by  a  Secretary  of  State  or  emanated  from  the 
Treasury  and  not  simply  from  the  Board  of 
Trade,  indicating  the  complete  change  in 
purpose.  The  attempt  to  break  up  the  illegal 
trade  with  the  French  had  made  it  manifest 
that  the  most  potent  instrument  which  the 
government  could  bring  to  bear  against  illegal 
trade  in  general  was  the  royal  navy.  The 
Navigation  Act  of  1660  had  given  authority 


ENFORCEMENT  OF  LAW  AND  ITS  RESULTS       83 

to  the  officers  of  the  navy  to  aid  in  its  enforce- 
ment only  in  the  case  of  vessels  violating  the 
law  restricting  the  carrying  trade  of  the  colo- 
nies to  English  or  colonial  ships.  The  civil 
officers  alone  were  empowered  to  enforce  the 
other  provisions  of  that  and  succeeding  acts. 
To  give  the  navy,  then,  the  power  to  proceed 
against  all  forms  of  illegal  trade,  it  was  enacted 
in  1763  that  officers  of  the  navy  should  be 
on  the  same  footing  as  custom-house  officers. 
Special  ships  were  also  fitted  out  for  the  pur- 
pose of  intercepting  illegal  trade. 

The    evident    weaknesses    in    the    custom- 
house organization  itself  were  also  revealed  by 
the  smuggling  in  the  past  years.    The  correct- 
ing enactments  were  aimed  at  the  most  patent 
of    these.     The    connivance    of    the    officials 
having  made  possible  much  of  the  smuggling, 
all    discretionary    powers    were    henceforth  Reorgan- 
denied  to  customs  officers.     They  were  for-  customs 
bidden  to   accept  as  formerly   the  duty   on  Service 
part  of  a  cargo  as  payment  for  the  whole,  and 
their   salaries   were   established   on   a   firmer 
basis,  diminishing  the  temptation  for  them  to 
resort  to  bribes.     All  coasting  vessels,  which, 
although  of  small  tonnage,  could  go  to  the 


84       SMUGGLING  IN  THE  AMERICAN  COLONIES 

West  Indies,  had  to  get  "sufferances"  and 
take  detailed  "cockets"  at  each  lading.  This 
had  not  been  demanded  before  and  therefore 
those  vessels  most  suitable  for  the  smuggling 
trade  had  been  free  from  such  supervision. 
Those  high  in  the  customs  service,  who  were 
wont  to  remain  in  England,  were  ordered  to 
their  posts  and  received  strict  instructions  to 
do  their  utmost  to  prevent  all  forms  of  illegal 
trade,  in  order  to  obtain  as  great  a  revenue  as 
possible.  Jurisdiction  in  all  cases  arising  from 
the  Acts  of  Trade  was  given  to  the  admiralty 
courts,  sitting  without  juries.  The  governors 
of  all  the  provinces  were  required  to  report 
on  the  state  of  trade  in  their  dominions.  In 
passing,  we  should  notice  that  these  reports 
asserted  that  violations  of  the  Acts  of  Trade 
in  general  were  infrequent  and  of  small  relative 
importance.  The  evasions  of  the  Molasses 
Act  were  always  excepted  and  in  some  of  the 
reports  were  entirely  omitted,  the  facts  being 
too  well  known  for  restatement.  To  connect 
more  closely  the  administrative  officials  with 
England,  the  Earl  of  Northumberland  was  ap- 
pointed, in  1764,  Vice-Admiral  for  all  America, 
and  William  Spry,  Judge  of  the  Vice-Admiralty 


ENFORCEMENT  OF  LAW  AND  ITS  RESULTS       85 

Court  for  all  America.  Later,  in  1768,  Cus- 
toms Commissioners  for  America,  five  with 
Burch  and  Hulton,  entered  on  the  scene. 
These  were  the  essential  changes  made  to  bol- 
ster up  the  administration  of  the  Trade  Laws. 
The  "writs  of  assistance"  which  we  have  seen 
were  first  used  about  1756,  were  the  most 

Continued 

potent  instruments  to  serve  the  rejuvenated  Use  of 
collecting  arm  of  the  British  Treasury.  Their  "  Writs  " 
use  and  abuse  were  confined  for  the  most  part 
to  cases  against  evaders  of  the  molasses  and 
sugar  duties.  Whether  or  not  we  agree  with 
President  Adams  when  he  says,  "I  do  say  in 
the  most  solemn  manner,  that  Mr.  Otis's  ora- 
tion against  writs  of  assistance,  breathed  into 
this  nation  the  breath  of  life,"  the  fact  remains 
that  what  caused  the  extended  use  of  the  writs 
to  be  attempted  was  the  smuggling  in  connec- 
tion with  the  West  Indies  trade. 

At    the    same    time    as    the    reduction    on  Additional 

molasses,  duty  was  laid  on  Madeira  wines  and  j*evenue 

Measures 

certain  French  and  Oriental  manufactures. 
Revisions  were  also  made  in  the  drawback 
system  which  operated  to  the  advantage  of 
the  home  country.  A  blending  of  purposes  is 
here  discernible,  indicating  that  the  transition 


86       SMUGGLING  IN  THE  AMERICAN  COLONIES 

from  a  protective  to  a  revenue  basis  was  grad- 
ual and  that  commercial  influences  were  still 
at  work.  But  the  effect  of  the  revenue- 
producing  measures  was  so  much  more  im- 
portant that  to  the  colonists  the  change 
appeared  abrupt  and  momentous. 

The  combined  efforts  of  the  royal  navy, 
hitherto  particularly  effective,  and  of  the  re- 
organized customs  service  were  not  of  sufficient 
strength  to  break  up  the  contraband  trade. 
Both  the  war  vessels,  and  the  sloops  especially 
fitted  out  to  break  up  the  smuggling,  were 
lightly  esteemed  by  the  colonists.     One  writer 
asserts   that   the   colonists   considered   it   "a 
sacred  duty"  to  break  the  trade  laws.1     Ex- 
aggerated as  this  statement  is,  it  contains  an 
element  of  truth.     Previous  to  1763  motives 
Smuggling    of  self-protection  may  have  led  the  merchants 
strongly      *°  consider  it  a  Huty  to~smuggle  in  all  the 
Entrenched  goods  possible;  after  that  date,  a  feeling  of 

to  be = , 1— = —  — : —     . 

Broken  Up  resentment  at  the  principles  of  taxajtion  in- 
volved may  have  led  the  populace  to  give 
moral  and  material  support  to  the  revenue- 
evading traders! This  conjecture  is  con- 
firmed by  a  study  of  the  events  attending  the 

1  S.  G.  Fisher,  The  Struggle  for  American  Independence,  I,  51. 


ENFORCEMENT  OF  LAW  AND  ITS  RESULTS      87 

attempted  enforcement  of  the  Sugar  Act. 
Violence  to  custom-house  officers  had  pre- 
viously been  almost  unknown,  probably  be- 
cause of  their  willingness  to  gain  popular 
favor  through  a  lax  administration  of  their 
offices.  Now,  however,  appeared  a  change 
in  the  temper  of  the  people,  and  this  hostile 
temper  was  incensed  more  and  more  until  the 
war  resulted.  Take,  for  instance,  a  few  of  the 
less  well-known  occurrences  noted  in  Scharf 
&  Westcott's  "History  of  Philadelphia."1 

In  1769,  John  Swift,  a  revenue  officer, 
seized  a  cargo  of  Madeira  wine,  placing  it  in  a 
store-house.  During  the  night  the  wine  was 
stolen  by  a  band  of  citizens,  who  later  stoned 
the  collector's  house.  Although  the  owner 
returned  the  wine  to  the  officers  and  some 
of  the  leaders  of  the  riot  were  arrested,  in- 
formers in  the  case  were  seized,  pilloried,  and 
tarred  and  feathered.  Armed  vessels  were 
used  by  the  officers  but  their  operation  was 
made  difficult  in  that  when  seizures  were  made, 
the  prizes  were  usually  rescued  by  armed 
men  who  had  no  fear  even  in  destroying  the  sentiment 

King's    ships.     Perhaps    the    most    just    cri-  Favored 

Law 

1  Scharf  &  Westcott'8  History  of  Philadelphia,  III,     1801  ff.  Evasion 


88       SMUGGLING  IN  THE  AMERICAN  COLONIES 

terion  of  the  temper  of  the  people  is  found 
in  the  following  extract  from  Bradford's 
"Pennsylvania  Journal"  of  October,  1773,  in 
connection  with  the  appearance  in  Philadel- 
phia of  Eben  Richardson,  a  treasury  spy  sent 
from  Boston.  After  describing  the  man,  the 
Journal  suggested  that  "All  lovers  of  Liberty 
will  make  diligent  search  and  having  found 
this  bird  of  darkness  will  produce  him  tarred 
and  feathered  at  the  Coffee-House,  there  to 
expiate  his  sins  against  his  country  by  a 
public  recantation." 

The  stories  of  cargoes  seized  for  non-pay- 
ment of  duties  and  rescued  by  rioters  in  Phil- 
adelphia are  duplicated  in  the  histories  of  each 
of  the  great  sea-ports.     Added  incentives  to 
Brutality      forcible  protests  were  found  in  the  brutality 
of  Revenue  of  the  revenue  officers  in  their  eagerness  for 
Officers       private  gain.     It  was  alleged  that  in  one  year 
the  collectors  pocketed  illegally  £17,000,  while 
it  was  further  alleged  that  vessels  illegally 
laden,  were  allowed  purposely  to  leave  port 
so  that  they  could  later  be  brought  back  as 
prizes. 

The  one  indubitable  feature  of  the  protests 
against  the  enforcement  of  the  Trade  Laws 


ENFORCEMENT  OF  LAW  AND  ITS  RESULTS      89 

is  that  those  who  continued  to  evade  them 
received  the  moral  support  of  the  people  as 
a  whote.  This  support  increased  each  year 
after  1763.  At  that  date,  long  established 
trade  customs,  based  on  what  were  considered 
natural  rights,  formed  the  main  argument  in 
justifying  the  traders  to  continue  as  formerly. 
But  the  effort  to  raise  a  revenue  from  this  indis- 
pensable commerce  served  to  arouse  every 
citizen  and  that  which  aroused  them  was  not 

primarily  the  burden  of  tax  itself  but  a  reali-  Commercii 

.  .  Grievance 

zation  that  danger  lurked  in  the  new  principle  supersede 

propounded.     Thus  a  question  of  government  J,y  Pohtlca 
in  relation  to  commerce  served  to  awaken  a  po- 
litical consciousness  which  exerted  an  increas- 
ingly strong  influence,  culminating  in  1776. 

In  importance,  the  commercial  and  eco- 
nomic sources  of  dissatisfaction  steadily  dwin- 
dled while  the  political  forces  which  they  had 
generated  increased  even  more  rapidly.  In 
the  great  political  protest  caused  by  the 
Stamp  Act  (1765),  by  the  Townshend  Actij 
(1767),  and  by  the  subsequent  governmental 
regulations  of  Parliament,  the  commercial 
element  is  almost  entirely  lacking.  A  com- 
plete reversal  of  tactics  on  the  part  of  the 


90       SMUGGLING  IN  THE  AMERICAN  COLONIES 

colonists  is  exhibited  in  the  Non-importation 
Agreements  (1765  and  1767-1770).  In  view 
of  the  duties,  it  might  have  been  expected 
that  a  great  smuggling  trade  would  have 
grown  up  in  those  European  commodities  so 
essentiaTtothe  Americans.  Bxttjas  the  impor- 
tation of  these  articles  would  have  sooner  or 


nists  were  led,  from  political  motives,  to  agree 
not  to  import  those  articles,  whirls 


economic    standpoint,,    would    have    been__j3jL 
great  advantage  to  them.    _ 

The  burning  of  the  Gaspee  in  Narragansett 
Bay  (1772),  and  the  destruction  of  the  tea  in 
Boston  harbor  (1773),  were  "applauded  by 
the  whole  continent"  as  the  newspapers  of 
National  the  time  had  it.  A  national  spirit  was  being 
Developed  rapidly  developed  and  it  needed  now  only 
the  use  of  military  force  by  the  British  to 
inflame  the  national  political  feeling  into  a 
militant  national  spirit,  striving  for  inde- 
pendence. By  the  time  of  the  Declaration  of 
Independence,  the  objections  to  the  commer- 
cial system  were  forgotten  and  no  reference 
is  made  to  them  in  the  grievances  except  that 
of  "cutting  off  the  trade  of  the  whole  world," 


ENFORCEMENT  OF  LAW  AND   ITS  RESULTS       91 

probably  referring  to  the  Boston  Port  Bill,  a 
punitive  measure  and  not  a  part  of  commer- 
cial policy. 

It  is  not  within  the  scope  of  this  essay  to 
continue  further  in  following  the  develop- 
ments directly  preceding  the  formal  break 
between  the  American  colonies  and  England. 
The  active  influence  of  commercial  regulations 
and  their  evasions  had  ceased.  The  move- 
ment which  they  were  instrumental  in  start- 
ing had  acquired  sufficient  momentum  to  carry 
itself  along  independently  of  any  additional 
initial  impetus  in  the  form  of  dissatisfaction 
with  commercial  situations.  After  the  British 
government  came  to  a  realization  of  the  futil- 
ity of  any  attempt  to  raise  a  revenue  by  the 
methods  hitherto  employed,  and  lowered  or 
removed  many  of  the  duties  previously  obnox- 
ious,1 it  was  evident  that  the  time  was  past 
when  such  conciliatory  measures  could  avail  TOO  Late 
in  checking  the  movement  for  entire  indepen-  c°onciliato 

dence.  Measures 

At  the  beginning  we  stated  that  it  would 

1  Against  the  protests  of  the  British  agricultural  interests,  great 
concessions  were  made  to  the  colonists  in  the  suspension  or  removal 
of  the  restrictions  on  the  importations  of  grain,  beef,  pork,  bacon, 
etc.  6  George  III,  3;  7  Geo.  Ill,  4;  8  Geo.  Ill,  9;  10  Geo.  Ill,  I. 


92       SMUGGLING  IN  THE  AMERICAN  COLONIES 

be  our  purpose  to  establish  the  part  which 
smuggling  played  in  the  elements  contributing 
to  the  development  of  the  spirit  of  indepen- 
dence. Briefly  let  us  summarize  our  facts  and 
Conclusions  conclusions  with  this  purpose  distinctly  in 
mind: — Lax  administration  and  consequent 
universal  evasion  of  governmental  regula- 
tions designed  to  restrict  that  part  of  the 
colonial  trade  which  economic  reasons  de- 
manded should  be  free  and  unrestrained, 
permitted  this  trade — that  with  the  foreign 
West  Indies — to  develop  to  such  an  extent 
and  importance  that  interference  with  it 
would  entail  commercial  disaster  which  the 
colonies  could  not  withstand.  When  the 
Seven  Years'  War  made  it  necessary  for 
England  to  attempt  to  break  up  the  trade 
because  of  the  aid  it  gave  to  the  French,  the 
magnitude  which  it  had  attained,  the  ineffi- 
ciency of  the  customs  service,  and  the  useful- 
ness of  the  royal  navy  were  revealed.  When, 
at  the  close  of  the  war,  the  need  of  funds  was 
pressing  in  England,  the  great  possibilities 
of  revenue  which  would  result  from  a  strict 
enforcement  of  the  Molasses  Act,  modified 
into  the  Sugar  Act,  led  Great  Britain  to 


ENFROCEMENT    OF  LAW   AND   ITS  RESULTS      93 

strike  at  the  West  Indies  trade  in  particular. 
Thus,  the  form  of  smuggling  most  general  at 
the  outbreak  of  the  Revolution, — almost  the 
only  one  of  any  extent  which  could  have  been 
caused  by  considerations  other  than  those  of 
private  greed, — a  form  of  smuggling  which 
had  formerly  been  considered,  by  reason  of 
long  enjoyment,  as  almost  legal  trade,  was 
now  transformed,  by  the  decision  to  enforce 
the  Sugar  Act,  into  smuggling  in  a  very  real 
sense.  '  This  occurred  at  a  time  when  the 
political  forces  incident  upon  the  introduction 
of  taxation  measures  and  the  removal  of  the 
danger  from  the  French  in  America,  directed 
the  minds  of  the  Americans  towards  indepen- 
dence. In  this  coalescence  of  commercial 
grievances  and  the  political  grievances  to 
which  they  contributed,  the  former  were  fi- 
nally completely  overshadowed  by  the  latter, 
and  smuggling  must  therefore  be  considered 
as  an  ultimate  rather  than  as  an  immediate 
cause  of  the  culmination  of  the  spirit  of  inde- 
pendence— the  American  Revolution. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

The  following  bibliography  represents  a  list  of  the  works  consulted 
in  the  preparation  of  this  essay. 


JOHN  ADAMS,  Works.     1850-1856. 

C.  McL.  ANDREWS,    Colonial    Self -Government    (American    Nation 
Series).     1904. 

JOHN  ASHLEY,  Some  Observations  on  a  Direct  Exportation  of  Sugar  from 

the  British  Inlands.     1735. 

W.  J.  ASHLEY,  Surveys,  Historical  and  Economic.     1900. 
G.  BANCROFT,  History  of  the  Vnited  States.     1882-1884. 
G.  L.  BEER,  British  Colonial  Policy.     1907. 
G.  L.  BEER,  Commercial  Policy  of  England  towards  the  American 

Colonies.     1893. 
Sir   i.   BERNARD,   Select   Letters  on  the   Trade  and  Government  of 

America.     1764. 

E.  G.  BOURNE,  Spain  in  America  (American  Nation  Series).  1904. 
EDW.  CHANNING  and  A.  B.  HART,  Guide  to  the  Study  of  American 

History.     1896. 

EDW.  CHANNING  and  A.  B.  HART,  American  History  Leaflets,  Num- 
bers 19  and  33. 

B.  EDWARDS,  History  of  the  British  West  Indies.     1793. 
S.  G.  FISHER,  The  Struggle  for  American  Independence.     1908. 
A.  K.  FISKE,  The  West  Indies.     1899. 
BENJ.  FRANKLIN,  Works,  edition  by  Sparks,    1856. 
A.  A.  GIESECKE,  American     Commercial     Legislation     before    1789. 

University  of  Pennsylvania  Studies.     1910. 
H.  GRAY,  Writs  of  Assistance,  in  Quincy's  Massachusetts  Bay  Reports. 

1865. 

E.  B.  GREENE,  Provincial  America  (American  Nation  Series).  1905. 
A.  B.  HART,  American  History  told  by  Contemporaries,  1897-1901. 
G.  E.  HOWARD,  Preliminaries  of  the  Revolution,  (American  Nation 

Series).     1905. 
MACDONALD,  Documentary  Source  Book  of  American  History.     1908 

D.  MACPHERSON,  Annals  of  Commerce.     1805. 
JAMES  MADISON,  Works.     1865. 

G.    R.    MINOT,    Continuation    of   the   History  of  the  Province  of 
.    Massachusetts  Bay.     1798-1803. 

95 


96  BIBLIOGRAPHY 

MONTESQUEIU,  The  Spirit  of  the  Laws,  1748. 

S.  A.  MORGAN,  Parliamentary  Taxation.     1911. 

JAMES  OTIS,  The  Rights  of  thf  British  Colonists  Asserted  and  proved. 

1764. 
TIMOTHY  PITKIN,  Statistical  View  of  the  Commerce  of  the   United 

States.     1817. 

T.  POWNAL,  Administration  of  the  Colonies.    4th  Edition,  1768. 
SCHARF  &  WESTCOTT,  History  of  Philadelphia.     1884. 
LORD  SHEFFIELD,  Observations  on  the   Commerce  of  the   American 

States.     6th  Edition,  1784. 

ADAM  SMITH,  The  Wealth  of  Nations.    3d  Edition,  1784  (1st,  1776). 
SPARKS,  Diplomatic  Correspondence  of  the  Revolution.     1829-1830. 
W.  TUDOR,  Life  of  James  Otis.     1823 
C.  H.  VANTYNE,  The  American  Revolution  (American  Nation  Series). 

1905. 

W.  B.  WEEDEN,  Economic  and  Social  History  of  New  England.  1890. 
J.  WINSOR,  Narrative  and  Critical  History  of  America.     1884-1889. 
Pennsylvania  Archives.     1852-1907. 
Documents  Relative  to  the  Colonial  History  of  New  York.     1853-1858. 


Critical  Essays  on  authorities  and  sources  are  found  in  the  works 
of  E.  B.  Greene,  G.  E.  Howard,  and  Justin  Winsor,  noted  above.  A 
very  complete  list  of  Public  Records  and  Laws,  General  Sources, 
General  Histories  and  Monographs,  most  of  which  touch  on  this 
subject,  is  given  by  A.  A.  Giesecke  in  American  Commercial  Legisla- 
tion before  1789. 


INDEX 


Act  of  1660,  llf.;  82f. 

Act  of  1663,  12f. 

Act  of  1673,  73. 

Act  of  1696  (7th  &  8th  of  Wil- 
liam III),  8;  75. 

Act  of  1699,  restricting  woolen 
manufacture,  22. 

Act  of  1733.     See  molasses  act. 

Act  of  1750,  regarding  iron, 
16f. 

Act  of  1757,  49:  54. 

Act  of  1764.    See  sugar  act. 

Acts  of  trade.  See  specific  acts 
just  above,  ch.  II,  passim,  and 
8ff.;  14f.;  27ff.;  33;  75;  77; 
80;  84;  85;  88f.;  evasions  of, 
probably  unimportant,  27ff,; 
feeling  about,  75.  See  molasses 
act,  and  navigation  acts. 

Adams,  John,  on  the  export  of 
fish,  39f.;  account  of  Otis's 
speech  by,  77f.;  judgment  of, 
of  same,  85. 

Albany  Congress,  on  King's  title 
to  unoccupied  land,  66. 

Aliens,  prohibition  of,  from  trad- 
ing in  colonies,  14f. 

Amherst,  General,  complaint  of, 
regarding  supplying  of  French, 
50f.;  regarding  courts,  60f. 

Ashley,  John,  on  export  of  sugar, 
37,  n.  2. 

Azores,  wines  from,  13,n. 

Balance  of  trade,  unfavorable, 
35;  37;  less  unfavorable  to 
Southern  colonies,  41. 


Bancroft,  on  revenue  from  Amer- 
ica, 9;  on  bounties  for  naval 
stores,  etc.,  17;  on  West  In- 
dies, 45. 

Barrels  and  hogsheads,  mate- 
rials for,  39. 

Beer,  on  value  of  colonies,  10;  44; 
on  tea  consumption  and  smug- 
gling, 30f.;  work  of,  on  extent 
of  contraband  trade,  54;  opin- 
ion of,  on  "the  movement 
toward  independence,"  70;  71. 

Bernard,  on  corruption  of  cus- 
toms officers,  47;  on  import  of 
molasses,  47f. 

Board  of  Trade  and  Plantations, 
46;  82:  report  of,  on  colonial 
manufactures,  20. 

Boston,  distilleries  at,  36. 

Boston  Port  Bill,  91. 

Bounties,  17;  65. 

Bowsprits,  12,  n.;  17. 

Bradford's  Journal,  extract  from, 
88. 

Brandy,  38. 

Bribes,  83;  88.    See  connivance. 

Burch,  a  customs  commissioner, 
85. 

Carrying  trade,  confined  by  navi- 
gation acts,  14f. 

Cattle,  20;  42,  n. 

Child,  on  American  colonies,  20; 
on  character  of  colonists,  70. 

Coasting  trade,  exclusion  of  for- 
eigners from,  14f.;  vessels  for, 
83f . ;  regulations  concerning,  84. 


97 


98 


INDEX 


Cocoa,  20. 

Coffee,  2. 

Cockets,  84. 

Collectors,  46f.;  83. 

Golden,  on  specie,  and  trade  with 
the  foreign  islands,  37. 

Colonial  manufactures,  develop- 
ment of,  19;  20;  21.  See  manu- 
factures, colonial. 

Colonial  policy  of  European  na- 
tions, 9f.;  24f.  See  England, 
colonial  policy  of. 

Colonial  system.  See  the  preced- 
ing, acts  of  trade,  and  ch,  II, 
passim;  feelings  of  colonists 
toward,  25f.;  26,  n.;  effects  of, 
on  Revolution,  26. 

Colonial  trade,  with  England,  16, 
and  n.;  28ff.;  31ff.;  35;  37f.;  54; 
65;  90f.;  91,  n.;  with  the  rest  of 
Europe,  13,  n.;  23;  29;  30f.; 
39f.;  47;  65;  85;  87:  with  the 
West  Indies,  4,  and  n.;  5;  7;  29; 
37,  and  n.  2;  38;  39f.;  41;  42, 
n.;  48f.;  52;  60,  and  n.;  82;  92f. 
See  Seven  Years'  War.  See 
slave  trade,  and  specific  com- 
modities. 

Colonies,  products  of,  12,  n.;  20; 
21;  23;  34;  41;  42,  n.;  45;  69; 
79  cf.  llf.,  and  see  West  Indies, 
products  of. 

Commerce,  expansion  of,  1 ;  dan- 
gers of,  in  early  West  Indies,  6; 
character  of,  7;  value  of,  8ff.; 
motive  of  colonization,  25. 
See  colonial  trade. 

Commercial  policy,  9.  See  co- 
lonial policy. 

Commercial  rivalry,  23f. 

Commercial  system,  English,  ch. 


II;  79.  See  acts  of  trade,  navi- 
gation acts,  and  colonial  system. 

Community  of  political  senti- 
ment, 72f.;  74;  80f. 

Conciliatory  measures,  too  late, 
91. 

Connivance  with  smugglers,  47; 
cf.71;  comparative  heinousness 
of,  48;  effects  of,  83.  See  cus- 
toms service  and  bribes. 

Contraband  trade.  See  smug- 
gling, and  Seven  Years'  War. 

Competition,  of  colonial  with 
English  merchants,  65. 

Competitive  articles,  in  English 
trade  with  the  colonies,  29. 

Cotton,  2;  11;  20  ;  42,  n. 

Courts,  friction  between  vice- 
admiralty  and  common  law,  59, 
and  n.;  Pownall  on,  59,  n.;  N. 
Y.  collector  on,  60;  complaints 
of  Amherst  regarding,  60f . ;  ad- 
miralty, 84. 

Crown,  relations  of,  to  colonists, 
66ff.;  policy  of,  68. 

Credit,  long,  to  American  mer- 
chants, 31 ;  cf .  65. 

Customs  commissioners  for 
America,  85. 

Customs  officers,  use  of  writs  of 
assistance  by,  75;  feeling  to- 
ward, 87;  brutality  and  greed 
of,  88;  corrupt  gains  of,  88. 
See  next  heading. 

Customs  service,  weakness  of,  46; 
58;  83;  92;  organization  of,  46; 
reform  of,  82f.;  laxity  of,  87; 
92.  See  connivance,  smuggling. 
Seven  Years'  War,  and  the 
preceding. 

Customs  taxation,  in  colonies,  73. 


INDEX 


99 


Danish  islands,  trade  with,  38. 

De  Berdt,  on  restricting  Ameri- 
can trade,  37,  n.2. 

Defence,  naval,  8;  26. 

Denmark,  permitted  commercial 
freedom  to  St.  Thomas,  51. 

Denny,  Governor,  sale  of  "flags 
of  truce "  by,  50. 

Deputy  collectors,  46. 

Discontent,  local  before  1763,  74. 

Distilleries,  36. 

Dominica,  "free  port"  in,  51. 

Drawbacks,  18;  65;  modified,  85f. 

Dutch,  intermediaries  in  illicit 
trade,  52;  seizures  of,  under 
"rule  of  1756,"  52.  See  Hol- 
land. 

Dutch  islands,  trade  with,  38. 

Duties,  reduction  or  removal  of, 
91.  See  export  duties,  old  sub- 
sidy, Stuarts,  plantation  duty, 
molasses  act,  sugar  act,  mo- 
lasses duties,  sugar  duties,  Ma- 
deira wines,  manufactures, 
drawbacks,  taxation,  revenue, 
etc.,  and  Townshend  duties. 

Dye-woods,  11. 

Earthenware,  28. 

Edwards,  on  slave  trade,  5,  and  n. 

Embargo,  by  Pennsylvania,  51, 
n.;  general,  55. 

England,  advantaged  by  change 
in  drawback  system,  85f.;  co- 
lonial policy  of,  9f.;  13f.;  15: 
colonial  trade  with,  Sheffield 
on,  32;  Madison  on,  33:  "free 
ports"  of,  51:  commercial  posi- 
tion of,  31ff . :  prohibition  of  ex- 
port of  coin  by,  3:  reasons  for 
advantage  in  trading  with  the 


colonists,  31ff.;  variations  in 
policy  of,  66. 

"English,"  meaning  of  term  in 
navigation  acts,  13,  n. 

Enumerated  articles,  llf.;  12,  n.; 
14;  15;  18;  19. 

Evasion  of  law,  facilitated  by 
dependence  of  officials,  71.  See 
connivance,  customs  service, 
smuggling,  and  Seven  Years' 
War. 

Exchequer  Court,  issue  of  writs 
by,  75f. 

Expenditures,  by  Great  Britain, 
on  colonial  account,  63,  n. 

Export  duties,  73.  See  draw- 
backs. 

Fanueil,  connection  of  with 
smuggling,  48. 

Financial  aid,  of  colonies  to  Eng- 
land, 49;  56;  63f.;  66. 

Fish,  12,  n.;  ISf.;  34;  35;  39f.; 
42,  n.;  49;  exports  of,  39f. 

Fisheries,  13,  n.;  statistics  of,  39f.; 
importance  of  West  Indies 
trade  to,  40;  42,  n. 

"Flags  of  truce,"  50f. 

Flour,  39;  42,  n.;  54. 

Food  staples,  export  of,  during 
the  Seven  Years'  War,  49;  54; 
66.  See  Seven  Years'  War. 

France,  brandy  trade  of,  protec- 
tion to,  38:  colonial  policy  of, 
10:  competition  with,  23;  32f.: 
"free  ports"  of,  51:  manufac- 
factures  of,  smuggled  into  col- 
onies, 31 :  opening  of  ports  by, 
52:  power  of,  in  America,  56, 
and  n.;  72;  81:  prohibition  of 
export  of  coin  by,  3. 


100 


INDEX 


Franklin,  on  payment  for  im- 
ports from  England,  37f . ;  opin- 
ions of,  on  sovereignty,  67. 

"Free  ports,"  5 If. 

French,  illegal  trade  with,  48ff.; 
55;  58;  82;  92.  See  Seven 
Years'  War,  and  next  heading. 

French  islands,  smuggling  of 
manufactures  from,  81;  pro- 
hibited from  exporting  rum  to 
France,  38;  trade  of  colonists 
with,  38;  48f.;  49;  82;  depend- 
ence of,  for  food  supplies,  49. 

Fruits,  Portugal,  47. 

Fustic,  11. 

Gaspee,  burning  of,  90. 

Germany,  export  of  linen  from, 
29;  competition  with,  32f. 

Giesecke,  work  of,  on  colonial 
tariffs,  73. 

Ginger,  11;  20. 

Glass,  28. 

Government  in  the  colonies,  68f. 

Governors,  position  of,  relative  to 
enforcement  of  restrictions, 
46;  dependence  of,  for  salaries, 
71;  treatment  of,  by  people,  74; 
instructions  to,  source  of,  82; 
reports  of,  84. 

Grain  (or  "corn"),  20;  84;  91,  n. 
See  provisions. 

Gray,  on  writs  of  assistance,  76. 

Grenville,  8;  9;  aim  of,  at  reform, 
63;  reform  measures  of,  82f. 

Grenville  Act.     See  sugar  act. 

Gridley,  on  writs  of  assistance, 
76f. 

Grievances,  commercial  super- 
seded by  political,  89;  93;  in 
Declaration,  90f. 


Gunpowder,  illegal  importation 
of,  60,  and  n. 

Haldane,  Governor,  on  vessels  at 
Monte  Christi,  53. 

Hamilton,  James,  embargo  at 
Philadelphia  ordered  by,  50f. 

Hats,  20;  21;  28. 

Hides  and  skins,  enumeration  of, 
19;  hides,  42,  n. 

Hinxman,  Captain,  on  vessels  at 
Monte  Christi,  53. 

Holland,  colonial  policy  of,  10: 
competition  with,  23;  32f. :  ex- 
port of  linen  from,  29;  "free 
ports"  of,  51:  liberal  policy  of, 
3:  smuggling  of  tea  from,  30: 
tobacco  shipment  to,  23f. 

Horses,  from  Scotland  and  Ire- 
land, 13,  n.;  in  West  Indies 
trade,  40;  42,  n. 

Howard,  on  smuggling,  62. 

Hulton,  a  customs  commissioner, 
85. 

Hutchinson,  decision  of,  on  writs 
of  assistance,  76. 

Illegal  (illicit)  trade,  7;  27;  30; 
84;  47;  48;  52;  55;  56;  58;  59; 
60;  63;  65;  82;  83;  84;  86.  See 
smuggling  and  Seven  Years' 
War. 

Indebtedness  of  colonists,  65. 
See  credit. 

Independence,  declaration  of, 
grievances  at  time  of,  90f; 
facilitated  by  dependence  of 
officials,  71;  by  expulsion  of 
French,  81;  93;  spirit  of,  orig- 
inal with  colonies,  71;  reasons 
for  keeping  in  background,  71; 


INDEX 


101 


not  due  to  acts  of  trade,  80; 
smuggling  hardly  an  immediate 
cause  of,  93. 

Indians,  72. 

Indigo,  11. 

Individualism,  of  colonists,  70; 
cf.  68f. 

Informers,  treatment  of,  87. 

Ireland,  11;  13,  n.;  22. 

Iron,  act  regarding,  16f.;  enumer- 
ation of,  19;  iron-making,  20. 

Iron  manufactures,  28. 

Isolation  of  colonists,  70. 

Jamaica,  "free  port"  in,  51. 
Judges,  dependence  of,  for  sal- 
aries, 71. 

Landed  interest,  care  of,  22. 
Linen,  20;  29;  trade  in,  statement 

of  Macpherson  on,  29. 
Lumber,  18f.;  19;  28,  n.;  34;  35; 

40;  42,  n.    See  timber. 

Macpherson,  figures  of,  on  colon- 
ial imports,  29;  on  linen  com- 
merce, 29. 

Madeira  wines,  13,  n.;  made  duti- 
able, 85;  seizure  of,  87. 

Madison,  on  trade  with  England, 
33. 

Manufactures,  colonial,  restric- 
tion of,  16f.;  21;  22;  develop- 
ment of,  19;  20;  21;  encourage- 
ment of,  16f.;  19:  English, 
superiority  of,  28f.;  31;  32f. 
(but  see  linen,  29):  increased 
esteem  of,  by  England,  45: 
French,  smuggling  of ,  31 ;  made 
dutiable,  85 :  linen,  29 :  Oriental, 
85.  See  specific  commodities. 


Massachusetts,  use  of  writs  of 
assistance  in,  75ff. 

Masts,  12,  n.;  17. 

Mauduit,  on  the  fishery,  quoted 
by  Minot,  40. 

Meat,  34;  91,  n.    See  provisions. 

Mercantilism,  adopted  by  north- 
ern trading  nations,  3. 

Merchants,  British,  8ff.;  31;  65. 

Middle  colonies,  market  for  prod- 
ucts of,  restricted,  34. 

Military  supplies,  importation  of, 
from  England,  54. 

Minot,  quoting  Mauduit  on  the 
fishery,  40. 

Molasses,  4,  n.;  34;  36;  38;  40; 
42,  n.;  43,  n.;  47;  60;  64. 

Molasses  act,  33f.;  34,  n.;  42;  72; 
78;  80f.;  82;  84;  92;  amended, 
64;  possible  reasons  for  non- 
enforcement  of,  43f.;  46ff.;  ac- 
cepted as  a  dead  letter,  57;  at- 
tempted enforcement  of,  59; 
relaxed  enforcement  of,  61. 

Molasses  duties,  estimate  of 
amount  if  collected,  48;  rev- 
enue from,  increase  of,  58f.;  85. 

Monopoly,  aim  of  commercial 
legislation,  10;  accorded  Vir- 
ginia tobacco,  24. 

Monte  Christi,  go-between  in 
contraband  trade,  52f. 

Montesquieu,  on  colonial  sys- 
tem, 24f. 

National  spirit,  90. 

"Naval  officers,  "46. 

Naval  stores  and  materials,  17; 

45. 
Navigation  acts,  8ff.;   14f.;  27. 

See  acts  of  trade. 


102 


INDEX 


Navy,  British,  protection  of  col- 
onies by,  26;  enforces  "rule  of 
1756,"  52;  aids  customs  officers 
58;  officers  of,  powers  of,  to  en- 
force trade  and  revenue  laws, 
82f.;  efficacy  of,  82;  86;  92. 

New  England,  market  for  products 
of,  restricted,  34;  products  of, 
20;  34;  42,  n. 

New  Hampshire,  use  of  writs  of 
assistance  in,  75. 

New  York,  collector  at,  on  courts 
and  smuggling,  60;  courts  of, 
60f. 

Non-importation  agreements,  90f . 

North  American  colonies,  unique 
character  of,  69f. 

Northumberland,  Earl  of,  made 
Vice- Admiral,  84. 

Old  subsidy,  18. 

Ordinance  of  1645,  8. 

Otis,  speech  of,  against  writs  of 
assistance  (as  given  by  Adams 
to  Tudor),  77f.,  but  see  note, 
78;  effect  of,  85. 

Painters'  colors,  28. 

Paper,  20;  29. 

Parliament,  relations  of,  to  col- 
onists, 69;  taxation  by,  73f.; 
regulations  of,  89f.  See  West 
Indies,  favoring  of,  and  pre- 
rogative. 

Partial  payment  of  duties,  by 
tea-smugglers,  30;  power  of 
collectors  to  accept,  47;  done 
away  with  by  Grenville,  83. 

Perm,  Admiral,  6. 

Pennsylvania,  trade  of,  38;  abuse 
of  "flags  of  truce"  by,  50;  em- 


bargo laid  by,  51,  n.;  courts  of, 
60f. 

Pennsylvania  Journal,  extract 
from,  88. 

Philadelphia,  embargo  at,  50f.; 
cases  of  seizure  at,  87f . 

Piracy,  prevalence  of,  in  West 
Indies,  6. 

Pitch,  17. 

Pitkin,  on  encouragement  of  co- 
lonial industry,  17f.;  on  devel- 
opment of  manufactures,  21; 
on  export  of  fish,  39. 

Pitt,  instructions  of,  on  illegal 
trade,  55;  opinion  of,  on  taxing 
colonies,  66. 

Plantation  duty,  73. 

Porcelain,  28. 

Portugal,  aim  of,  in  foreign  trade, 
2;  colonial  policy  of,  10;  fish 
trade  with,  40;  specie  from,  40; 
fruits  and  wines  of,  47. 

Pownall,  on  trade  with  W'est 
Indies,  42,  n.;  on  courts,  59,  n. 

Precious  metals,  object  of  foreign 
trade,  2f.;  prohibition  of  ex- 
port of,  3. 

Prerogative,  66ff.;  81;  interest  of 
colonists  in,  81. 

Privateering,  in  West  Indies,  6. 

Privy  Council,  46. 

Protection,  8ff.;  10;  15ff.;  21ff.; 
34;  85f.  See  acts  of  trade,  mo- 
lasses act,  and  customs  taxa- 
tion. 

Provisions,  18;  28,  n.;  40;  42,  n.; 
49;  51;  52;  54;  55;  66.  See  fish, 
grain,  meat,  rice,  etc. 

Regulations.  See  acts  of  trade 
and  customs  service. 

Restrictions,   80;   on  import   of 


INDEX 


103 


food-stuffs  into  England,  34; 
.91,  n.  See  acts  of  trade. 

Revenue,  need  of,  by  Great  Brit- 
ain, 63;  92;  policy  regarding,  9; 
12;  amount  and  cost  of,  from 
America,  9. 

Revenue  acts,  regulations  to  en- 
force, 82f. 

Revenue  duties,  73;  74;  85f.  See 
the  preceding,  and  references 
under  duties. 

Revolution.     See  independence. 

Rhode  Island,  distilleries  at,  36; 
abuse  of  "flags  of  truce,"  by, 
51. 

Rice,  41;  49. 

Richardson,  Eben,  case  of,  88. 

Rosin,  17. 

Rule  of  1756,  52. 

Rum,  4,  n.;  12,  n.;  18f.;  28,  n.;  34; 
36;  38;  40;  43,  n.;  trade  in,  with 
Africa,  36. 

St.  Domingo,  "free  ports"  in,  51. 

St.  Eustatius,  a  "free  port,"  51; 
illegal  imports  from,  60. 

St.  Thomas,  a  "free  port,"  51. 

Salaries,  of  governors  and  judges, 
71;  of  collectors,  83,  n. 

Salt,  13,  n. 

Salt  provisions,  18.  See  provis- 
ions. 

Searchers,  46. 

Seizures,  87;  88.  See  customs 
service,  and  navy. 

Servants,  from  Scotland  and  Ire- 
land, 13,  n. 

Seven  Years'  War,  contraband 
trade  during,  48ff.;  motives  of 
colonists  in,  50;  57;  aided  by 
the  "free  ports,"  51;  by  Monte 


Christi,  52;  extent  of,  53;  na- 
ture and  effects  of,  54;  66;  in- 
structions of  Pitt  concerning, 
55;  revelations  of,  79;  preva- 
lence of,  82;  92. 

Sheffield,  on  use  of  colonies,  10; 
45;  on  admission  of  American 
shipping  to  British  West  In- 
dies, 28;  on  American  trade, 
28ff.;  on  evasion  of  trade  regu- 
lations, 32;  on  preference  of 
colonists  for  trade  with  Eng- 
land, 32;  on  expenditures  on 
colonial  account,  63,  n. 

Shoes,  28. 

Ship-building,  34. 

Shipping,  British,  8ff.;  28,  n. 

Ships,  non-enumerated,  12,  and  n. 

Silks,  29. 

Slaves,  5  and  notes;  29;  36;  41. 

Slave  trade,  5;  36. 

Sloops,  for  use  against  smugglers, 
86. 

Smith,  Adam,  on  principle  of 
gain  from  foreign  trade,  3;  on 
commercial  system,  24f. 

Smugglers,  feelings  of,  57;  sup- 
port of,  89. 

Smuggling,  7;  31;  32;  33;  42;  47; 
48;  52;  54;  57;  58;  60;  62;  65; 
66;  72;  75;  82;  83;  84;  85;  86; 
89;  90;  93;  methods  of,  47;  in 
England,  48;  aided  by  "free 
ports,"  52;  revealed  by  Seven 
Years'  War,  58;  prevalence  of, 
60;  62;  Howard  on,  62;  vessels 
suited  to,  84;  induced  use  of 
writs  of  assistance,  85;  feeling 
about,  86;  93  cf.  71.  See  the 
preceding,  customs  service, 
and  Seven  Years'  War. 


104 


INDEX 


South  Carolina,  courts  of,  60f. 
See  next  heading. 

Southern  colonies,  less  chance  for 
manufactures  in,  20;  relations 
of,  to  West  Indies  trade,  41. 

Spain,  aim  of,  in  foreign  trade,  2; 
relations  of,  to  slave  trade,  5, 
and  n.;  colonial  policy  of,  9f.; 
rivalry  with,  23;  fish  trade 
with,  40;  specie  from,  40; 
power  of,  in  America,  72. 

Spanish,  as  intermediaries  in 
illicit  trade,  52. 

Spanish  islands,  trade  with,  38. 

Specie,  sources  of,  35;  36;  40;  49; 
need  of,  35;  49. 

Spirits,  43,  n.  See  brandy, 
rum,  and  wines. 

Spry,  William,  made  Vice-Admi- 
ralty Judge,  84f . 

Stamp  Act,  89. 

Steel  manufactures,  28. 

Stockings,  28. 

Stuarts,  revenue  policy  of,  9. 

Sufferances,  84. 

Sugar,  2;  5;  llf.;  20;  34;  37,  n. 


Sugar  act,  49,  n.  2;  64;  and  n.; 

65,  n.;  68;  72f.;  81;  87;   92; 

93. 
Sugar  duties,  85.     See  molasses 


Superior  Court,  issue  of  writs 
by.  75f . 

Surveyors,  46. 

Surveyors-general  of  customs, 
46. 

Swift,  John,  seizure  of  wine  by, 
87. 

Sympathy  of  colonists  witk  Eng- 
land, 50;  56. 


Tar,  17. 

Tariffs,  colonial,  7Sf. 

Taxation,  principle  of,  in  sugar 
act,  73;  levy  of,  by  colonies,  73; 
references  of  Adams  to,  77f; 
need  of,  81;  service  as  flux  to 
fuse  revolutionary  tendencies, 
81;  resentment  at,  86;  93; 
principle  of,  89. 

Tea,  29;  smuggling  of,  30;  de- 
struction of,  90. 

Timber,  12,  n.    See  lumber. 

Tobacco,  2;  11;  12,  n.;  18;  20; 
23f.;  41. 

Tories,  74. 

Townshend  duties,  64f.;  89. 

Trade,  colonial.  See  colonial 
trade,  and  commerce. 

Trading  companies,  2;  68. 

Treasury,  directs  instructions  to 
governors,  82;  aided  by  writs 
of  assistance,  85. 

Turpentine,  17. 

Vice-admiralty  courts,  apply  the 
"rule  of  1756,"  52.  See 
courts. 

Violence  toward  collectors,  47' 
87f. 

Viper,  at  Monte  Christi,  53. 

Virginia,  tobacco  trade  of,  23f.; 
Committee  of  Correspondence 
of,  views  of,  on  colonial  sys- 
tem, 26,  n.;  Lieutenant-Gov- 
ernor  of,  refuses  to  "license  a 
Flag  of  Truce,"  51. 

West  Indies,  products  of,  2;  4; 
trade  of,  with  England,  4,  and 
n.;  5;  with  North  America,  4; 
and  n.;  5;  7;  29;  37;  38;  39; 
early  trade  of,  6;  specie  from, 


INDEX 


105 


36f.;  trade  of,  importance  of, 
to  the  fisheries,  39f.;  relations 
of,  to  Southern  colonies,  41; 
commodities  in,  41;  42,  and 
n.;  reasons  for  favoring,  44f.; 
comparative  value  of,  44f . ;  sense 
of  government  favor  to,  45; 
attempt  of,  to  prohibit  trade 
with  foreign  islands,  45. 


Wines,  Azores,  13,  n.;  Madeira, 
13,  n.;  85;  87;  Portugal,  47. 

Writs  of  assistance,  75ff.;  85. 

Wool,  22f. 

Woolen  namufacture,  restriction 
of,  22. 

Woolens,  20;  22f.;  28. 

Yards,  17. 


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